Nuclear Fallacy: Dispelling the Myth of Nuclear Strategy
This slender essay marks the return to the strategic field of Halperin, who coauthored (with Thomas Schelling) Strategy and Arms Control, one of the pioneering works in arms control studies. Halperin argues that most of the history of nuclear confrontations since the 1940s has become myth: nuclear threats were "never" decisive in these crises; but the mythology has imprisoned American strategy, and created a dangerous reliance on nuclear threats. His solution is a familiar one: disavow any military use of nuclear weapons except in extreme circumstances and then only for "demonstration." Under the Halperin alternative, the president would inform the joint chiefs of staff never to plan on using any nuclear weapons.
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Ronald Reagan's dream never died; it only faded slightly. Star Wars is still with us in a scaled-back form. Although theater missile defenses -- popularized by the Gulf War's Patriots -- are now widely accepted, debate still rages over a nationwide system. Republicans worry about rogue states and terrorists with nukes, Democrats worry about angering Russia and violating treaty obligations, and neither side listens to the other. America is pouring billions of dollars into research and development, ignoring the fundamental flaws that missile defense has yet to overcome.
It is a delicate matter to defend deterrence, the doctrine that it is the very lethality of nuclear weapons that lessens the likelihood of their use sufficiently to make us safe. That the consciousness of that lethality in the corridors of power in Washington and Moscow has played an important role in the keeping of the peace since the advent of the nuclear age is beyond doubting, as is the unwisdom of tampering with that consciousness, of accepting theories or technologies that will diminish the terror with which the prospect of nuclear war has been traditionally regarded and make nuclear weapons in any way less inhibiting to use. Still, if it is possible to underestimate the contribution that nuclear weapons make to the prevention of nuclear war, it is possible to overestimate it, too.
The reelection of Ronald Reagan makes the future of his Strategic Defense Initiative the most important question of nuclear arms competition and arms control on the national agenda since 1972. The President is strongly committed to this program, and senior officials, including Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, have made it clear that he plans to intensify this effort in his second term. Sharing the gravest reservations about this undertaking, and believing that unless it is radically constrained during the next four years it will bring vast new costs and dangers to our country and to mankind, we think it urgent to offer an assessment of the nature and hazards of this initiative, to call for the closest vigilance by Congress and the public, and even to invite the victorious President to reconsider. While we write only after obtaining the best technical advice we could find, our central concerns are political. We believe the President_s initiative to be a classic case of good intentions that will have bad results because they do not respect reality.
