Nixon: The Education of a Politician, 1913-1962; The Foreign Politics of Richard Nixon: The Grand Design; The World and Richard Nixon
These three volumes will, each in its way, contribute to the rehabilitation of Mr. Nixon's reputation. The first-by a fine historian and biographer of Dwight D. Eisenhower-is a straightforward, no-nonsense political biography covering Nixon's career up to his 1962 defeat as a candidate for governor of California. Another volume will follow. Mr. Ambrose admits that he had never admired Mr. Nixon and had to be persuaded to undertake this work. But he is fair, giving Mr. Nixon full credit for intelligence, an extraordinary capacity for work, political skill and responsible behavior as vice president. On the other hand, he adds many details to the familiar story of a cold, ruthless campaigner suppressing or simply lacking the qualities of grace and compassion.
Mr. Schurmann's study is a repetitious blend of insight and the obvious. The argument that President Nixon's approach to the Soviet Union and China was innovative, constructive and his own (not merely borrowed from Henry Kissinger) is sound, but no longer startling. The best part of the book deals with the inapplicability of the "grand design" to the realities of the Third World. Most of the book was written in 1975-76; it would have had more impact had its publication not been delayed for a decade.
Mr. Sulzberger's The World and Richard Nixon is a fulsome tribute, a collection of long quotations by and about Mr. Nixon (many drawn from the author's diaries and interviews conducted over the years, including a long 1986 interview with his subject). Some of the material has been previously published.
Related
Author's Note: This article summarizes a section by S. M. Lipset in "They Would Rather Be Left," by S. M. Lipset and Gerald Schaflander, to be published next fall by Little, Brown.
Since September of 1970 a renewal of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis has been in prospect Highly placed White House sources reported that the Soviet Union had begun work on a submarine base on the southern coast of Cuba at Cienfuegos, a base which could repair and refuel missile-firing submarines of the Soviet Navy. Warnings were issued that this would be viewed with the "utmost seriousness" by the United States as a violation of the 1962 agreement by which land-based missiles were withdrawn from Cuba. Cited explicitly were President Kennedy's words that peace would be assured only "if all offensive missiles are removed from Cuba and kept out of the Hemisphere in the future."
Our reactions to Soviet foreign policy have a way of jumping from one extreme to another, both in the long and short run, with more regard for changing superficial appearances than permanent objective factors. During the last year of the Second World War, we tended to idealize the Russians, Stalin became "Uncle Joe" to be charmed by Roosevelt into coöperation, and the United Nations, having done away with "power politics," was supposed to be the vehicle of that coöperation. From 1947 onwards, the Kremlin was perceived as the headquarters of the devil on earth, causing all that was wrong with the world and, more particularly, scheming the destruction of the United States. These extreme swings of the pendulum can also be observed in much shorter time spans.

Sign-up for free weekly updates from ForeignAffairs.com.