A Death in November: America in Vietnam, 1963
American complicity in the overthrow and death of South Vietnam's President Ngo Dinh Diem is scarcely the world's best-kept secret, but Ellen Hammer has subjected the whole story to a detailed and very critical scrutiny, concentrating on the period January-November 1963. She tells of the Kennedy Administration's growing disenchantment with Diem, in large part because of his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu who, it was feared, was contemplating a deal with the North Vietnamese. Most intriguing, because of its resemblance to the Iran/contra affair, is the story of how three players-Averell Harriman, Roger Hilsman and Michael Forrestal-made end runs around an inattentive Kennedy and all his top officials (Rusk, McNamara, Taylor, McCone) and sent a signal to the American embassy in Saigon to back a military coup against Diem. Kennedy was reportedly shocked at the subsequent assassination of Diem and Nhu and complained that his advisers "had served him badly." But the author reasonably observes that "it seemed inconceivable that [Kennedy] had not realized that if the Americans unleashed a coup d'état in Saigon it could lead to murder." Another sorry tale, well told.
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Considers how the USA should (1) best encourage evolution towards democracy in Asia's socialist states, covering China after the Tienanmen Square demonstrations, North Korea's improving dialogue with South Korea, and Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambodia (2) resolve its trade policy differences with Japan, before issues become "thrust into the heat of the domestic political arena".
Reexamining the 30 and more years since Indochina entered the agenda of world problems one is struck constantly by the curious mirages, the discordance between image and reality which seem to persist not only in American perceptions of Indochina but in the evaluations by other great powers and the Indochinese themselves of the actual nature and goals of U.S. policy.
Eighteen months after its enunciation at Guam the Nixon Doctrine remains obscure and contradictory in its intent and application. It is not simply that the wider pattern of war in Indochina challenges the Doctrine's promise of a lower posture in Asia. More than that, close analysis and the unfolding of events expose some basic flaws in the logic of the Administration's evolving security policy for the new decade. The Nixon Doctrine properly includes more than the declaratory policy orientation. It comprises also the revised worldwide security strategy of "1½ wars" and the new defense decision-making processes such as "fiscal guidance budgeting." These elements have received little comment, especially in their integral relation to our commitments in Asia. But the effects of this Administration's moves in these areas will shape and constrain the choices of the United States for a long time to come.

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