Bitter Victory
A veteran correspondent who has been covering Vietnam for 40 years has combined history with penetrating observation and interviews to provide an absorbing account of what has happened in Vietnam and Cambodia since Hanoi won the war. Shaplen concludes that the Vietnamese want an accommodation with the United States in order to diminish their dependence on the U.S.S.R., and he also believes that they seek to mend their breach with the Chinese. To achieve these goals, however, the Vietnamese will have to withdraw from Cambodia and allow a genuinely neutral and independent government to exist there. Despite Shaplen's mild optimism, there are few signs that Hanoi is ready to do this. Nor is there much reason to believe, as he suggests, that the Chinese might in time be persuaded to stop backing the Khmer Rouge. Shaplen's Vietnamese interlocutors do provide an intriguing insight into how they won the war. According to them, the single most important factor in their success was the control of the Ho Chi Minh trail through eastern Laos-a clear violation of the Laotian neutrality agreement of 1962 negotiated by the Kennedy Administration.
Related
Despite the willingness of many Americans to settle for less than a satisfactory settlement in Viet Nam, and despite the possibility that events may foreclose the alternatives, it seems useful to examine just how "bad" a settlement we really are willing to accept and what the alternatives to such a settlement are. Despite heated discussion, some of the central issues involved in negotiations have not been debated-or at least not in sufficient detail and concreteness to make them clear. Indeed, so far each side is demanding victory on its own terms, the only difference being that we have offered North Viet Nam some face-saving devices, while Hanoi talks as if it is determined to humiliate us. Thus many people have dismissed these public positions as debating stances or meaningless rhetoric designed to raise morale or inspire confidence among allies and supporters-not serious approaches to settlement.
As the war in Viet Nam grows in bitterness and destructiveness, the call for negotiation grows more insistent. The issue we confront, however, is not simply whether a settlement of the war should be negotiated. The question rather is a threefold one. How should we go about it? What can we expect from it? Can we arrange a settlement that has a fair chance of success? During the next several months, the American people, already emotionally tortured and intellectually frustrated by the war, are destined to be treated to large doses of oratory which will do nothing to lift the veil of confusion surrounding the question of negotiations. It may be worthwhile, then, to explore some of the issues and implications that we (and our allies and our adversaries) will have to deal with if, in fact, negotiations get under way.
Considers prospects for a long-overdue revision of US policy towards Vietnam. The UN policy to resolve the Cambodian conflict is quixotic, and now that the USSR has withdrawn as a regional power, there exists a strategic vacuum which the USA can move to fill.

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