NATO is facing new challenges; there is confusion and uncertainty about its security requirements in the light of Gorbachev's nuclear disarmament proposals, and a need for a more concentrated effort to meet these challenges, which cannot be left to the USA alone. A common strategy for deterrence is a pre-requisite for a common strategy for arms reductions.
Christoph Bertram is the Diplomatic Correspondent of the West German weekly Die Zeit. From 1974 to 1982 he was the Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.
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In the light of the anticipated INF agreement the question is whether confrontation is entering a genuine phase of de-escalation or merely a tactical one. Most NATO commanders agree that a surprise attack by conventional Soviet forces is improbable. NATO should develop a plan for exploiting the potential for reductions in conventional weapons and make a serious effort to achieve an agreement. There may be room for trade-offs in economic credits and managerial skills for large-scale Soviet force reductions.
Defends the traditional, pessimistic evaluation of NATO's conventional capabilities against revisionists, and argues that "NATO is highly unlikely to make the conventional force improvements seemingly dictated by the INF treaty". Predicts a Soviet arms control offensive upon "a vulnerable and divided NATO... the alliance has painted itself into a corner, and the paint will not dry". Despite all this, NATO will continue to prevent war in Europe.
In recent months, many observers have concluded that the United States and Europe are on divergent paths and that the transatlantic alliance is crumbling. In spite of some real differences, however, American and European attitudes remain remarkably similar on most key issues. Basing policy on the false assumption of transatlantic divorce would only make it a self-fulfilling prophecy.
