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Extended Deterrence: The United States and NATO Europe

Stephen J. Cimbala
Reviewed by By Gregory F. Treverton
Fall 1987
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Stephen J. Cimbala
Lexington Books
1987
229 pp.
$32.00

This is more a collection of essays than a book, but Cimbala is thoughtful and open-minded; he understands the interconnection of American strategic forces and deterrence in Europe. In that regard, his discussion of the implications of strategic defense for NATO, although scattered throughout several places in the book, is thorough and provocative.

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