Strategic Defenses and Soviet-American Relations; The Technology, Strategy, and Politics of SDI; Perspectives on Strategic Defense; The SDI Challenge to Europe
SDI is in political ebb, but books about it are in flow-all without our knowing exactly what it is. Of the edited volumes, that by Wells and Litwak is the best, with a relatively brief introduction that sets SDI in the context of both history and American offensive force modernization. Charles Glaser's chapter and the ensuing panel discussion on the problem of transition are especially interesting. The Cimbala volume, most of whose authors are of more conservative bent, is strongest in its treatment of point defenses. The Guerrier and Thompson volume is a source book, with short analyses and statements of position by political figures, for and against SDI. Daalder has the benefit both of single authorship and of being a European who knows American strategy well. He understands strategy but gives primacy to politics. This long essay is the best discussion of SDI and Europe so far.
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US public expectations of a 'peace dividend' from the collapse of the socialist bloc are unrealistic. Structural properties of US defence policy-making, and the non-existence of any strategic vision not predicated on the monolithic Soviet threat, mean that "for the next several years the 'peace dividend' will be much smaller than enthusiasts hope, and earning it will require departures from customary congressional habits". Offers advice on a strategy for reducing US defence expenditure (1) avoid a return to the 'hollow army' by shifting towards reserve or 'round-out' units (2) cut US forces in Europe in the light of CFE results, not in advance of them (3) defer various high-price equipment programmes, while preserving R&D budgets (4) using arms control to cut what the USA "can safely do without".
In many areas, transatlantic cooperation is stronger than ever before. Yet the common perception is of an increasingly fraught relationship, as evidenced by the well-known disputes over beef, bananas, and burden sharing. Assumptions are diverging over security risks and cultural values. Each side criticizes the other's unwieldy policymaking process without admitting its own shortcomings, while leaders pander to domestic interests and prejudices without educating voters on international issues. Europe nonetheless remains indispensable to a multilateral U.S. foreign policy. The Bush administration must acknowledge the European Union as a true partner, in political and military matters as well as in economics. America cannot expect its allies to share the burdens of global leadership without allowing them their say in the issues at stake.
IT would be an exaggeration to describe the current discussion of our relations with the Soviet Union and with Western Europe as another Great Debate. Perhaps in the language of the times it might be called a Mini- Debate, distracted as it is and emotionally charged by events elsewhere which, however, may prove to be less fateful in the long run.
