Soviet Strategic Deception
Deception, as the many authors of this massive work demonstrate, is an integral part of Soviet strategy, propaganda, diplomacy and military planning. The book is a valuable resource for those, whether in public office or outside, who have an interest in knowing what the Soviets are aiming at, how they operate, and what success they have had. The most informative chapters, by former or current professionals in U.S. intelligence services, describe Soviet organization, themes and past practices of deception. Some of the others have considerable ideological content of their own and are mainly directed to criticism of those on the American side who allegedly have allowed the Soviets to put the West at a disadvantage through use of deception; much of this argument follows that of the opponents of the SALT and ABM agreements and the whole process of arms control through negotiation.
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Will Russia be run by democrats or oligarchs? The signs are worrying. The West would rather not dwell on the extent to which Russia's market is dominated by robber barons and permeated by crime and corruption. Russia's democracy is weak, with unfair election campaigns, a compromised media, and few checks on the presidency. The West cannot afford to let Russia descend into chaos, which might mean losing control of Russia's arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, but its two-faced NATO expansion policy hurts the democrats' chances.
Gorbachev's foreign policy has the same aim as that of his predecessors, with the addition of tactical flexibility and sophisticated PR, and he is in more control of it. Arms control policy is the one difference, but he will get nowhere as long as he insists on linking progress with the banning of SDI.
Discusses (1) the size of Soviet military forces (nuclear, naval, air and ground) (2) the ideological drive behind Soviet defence policy (3) possible future doctrinal developments. Since the late 1970s, changing technology has stimulated doctrinal change, giving rise to concepts of multi-front operations. But the doctrinal vision is at the moment unrealisable, and the Soviets may thus be seeking to reduce nuclear arsenals, so as to make defence of the rear easier in wartime. Concludes that, in the light of the continuing ideological basis of Soviet doctrine, the West must be careful not to underestimate the danger which lies behind the undermining of deterrence through badly-conceived arms control measures. Director, National Security Agency, 1985-88. Very useful analysis, recommended.

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