Waltzing with a Dictator: The Marcoses and the Making of American Policy; Rebuilding a Nation: Philippine Challenges and American Policy
At the descriptive level, Bonner's book is a richly detailed account of U.S. policy toward the Philippines after Marcos declared martial law in 1972. (The author bases his account on more than 3,200 previously classified documents and interviews with some 70 U.S. officials.) At an analytical level, however, the book is disappointing. There is no serious discussion of U.S. strategic interest in the Philippine bases in the light of Soviet-American rivalry in the Pacific, the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea or the Soviet presence in Cam Ranh Bay. Bonner neglects the fact that in the early years of martial law Marcos had a genuinely reformist appeal. Finally, there is little recognition of the dilemmas faced by policy-makers in dealing with friendly autocrats in countries where the U.S. has substantial security interests. Landé's volume is a collection of essays by former government officials and academics, and it ranges much more broadly over the issues. By far the most penetrating analysis is William Overholt's essay on the decline of Marcos and the problems facing President Aquino. Overholt concludes that Aquino has a window of opportunity to organize a civilian political base and adopt the needed economic reforms, but he cautions that the window is small and that she has not yet moved decisively toward it.
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A Diplomat, after a seven-year tour of duty in the Philippines, once christened the islands an "enchanting archipelago." Whether he was merely being polite, or had succumbed to government pitchmen, or had himself become enchanted by the lush tropical beauty of the islands, he should also have seen a country wracked by afflictions, some common to all countries engaged in the desperate race to develop, some peculiar to the Philippines.
Max Boot tells only half the story; U.S. small wars did not look that small to the losers.
American optimism about East Asia, in precious short supply only a few years earlier, was abundantly available in 1980. "The arc from Korea through Taiwan and the Philippines, at the very center of great power rivalry for much of this century, is less subject to these strains today than at any time in well over forty years," Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke declared in June. Such pronouncements by U.S. policymakers were understandable: East Asia offered far more possibilities--for diplomatic overtures, for expanding trade--than anyone dared predict during the Vietnam era. But in 1980 enough warning signals were flashing throughout the region to suggest the need for a more balanced--and less buoyant--assessment.
