Three issues preoccupy Asia's leaders (1) economic strategy (2) political stability versus greater openness (3) regionalism. The accelerating socio-economic revolution presents challenges to both the Marxist and the democratic states. There is a requirement for increased public participation, greater local autonomy and more regional and international interaction. On balance the odds favouring a largely peaceful revolution are lengthening.
Robert A. Scalapino is Robson Research Professor of Government and Director of the Institute for East Asian Studies of the University of California at Berkeley. He is a coeditor of Asian Survey and the author of Modern China and Its Revolutionary Process, Major Power Relations in Northeast Asia, and other works.
As Asia approaches the 21st century, three overarching issues preoccupy its leaders - issues that cut broadly across cultural and political lines. The first relates to the appropriate economic strategy for the years immediately ahead. Economic concerns affect virtually every society in the vast expanse known as the Pacific-Asian region, be it labeled an advanced industrial nation, a newly industrializing country (NIC), or a (hopefully) developing state.
Second is the clash between the requirements of political stability and the growing demand for greater openness. The demand for openness flows from the pressures of the emerging elites for both greater political freedom and increased participation in the decision-making process.
The third broad issue is how the nations of the area will relate to each other, and to outside powers, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union. Regionalism is growing, and local states are asserting increased independence from both superpowers. The danger of large-scale war is declining, and the prospects for peaceful evolution are stronger.
On the whole, there are grounds for optimism.
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Only a few years ago, most of Asia's leaders exuded greater confidence in the economic policies being pursued. The socialist societies, essentially following a Stalinist "big push" strategy, proudly proclaimed their success, publishing reams of statistics that showed major quantitative advances.
Their claims were not without validity. The Stalinist approach - with its single-minded concentration of human and material resources upon industrialization, employing centralized command tactics and rigid political controls - produced significant initial gains, both in the U.S.S.R. and among its most apt Asian disciples. It represented a viable method of "catching up," if unevenly, with societies that had taken a more leisurely course. But at a certain point, diminishing returns set in. The innate staticism - the low evolutionary potential - of this strategy made itself felt in the weak initiatives, low productivity, excessive waste of resources and manpower, and poor quality that were the hallmarks of an autarkic system. It is the supreme irony that states operating under the internationalist imperatives of Marxism should have largely insulated themselves from the dynamic global currents that were flowing in the economic realm. Obsolescence loomed as a very real threat.
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American political and business leaders need to capitalize on a groundswell of democratic and market-opriented reforms underway in this oft-neglected region in the world. "Washington must discard its Cold War approach to relations with south Asia and stop viewing the region primarily in terms of its potential threat to U.S. interests"; a rapidly growing south Asian middle-class is creating one of the "world's most important emerging markets" and bolstering regional stability.
Over two decades, Americans have come to expect dynamic economic growth and relative political stability in East Asia. Until recently, China was the perennial exception, and the Soviets had no regional role to speak of. Today, these judgments are being reexamined. The region is not necessarily in trouble, but it is in ferment, and the future is less sure--for itself and for American interests--than it seemed even a short while ago. Furthermore, the economic and political stirrings are not of a short-term nature; they involve generational and systemic transitions within the region and shifting roles for external actors, including the United States and, now, the Soviet Union.
Over the past decade, China's leaders have pursued rapid economic reform while stifling political change. The result today is a rigid state that is unable to cope with an increasingly organized, complex, and robust society. China's next generation of leaders, set to take office in 2002-3, will likely respond to this dilemma by accelerating political reform -- unless a new cold war with the United States intervenes.
