U.S. Foreign Policy and European Security; New Conventional Weapons and Western Defence
The columnist Meg Greenfield wrote in 1980: "I have been trying to think of a time when the Alliance was in array." That theme-the durability of NATO through disruption and differing interests-is the center of Cyr's brief historical essay. His material is not new, but his summary is readable and his reminder apt. The Bellany-Huxley volume, the result of a project at Lancaster University's Centre for the Study of Arms Control and International Security, addresses a recent "disruption"-the development of new conventional technology. Many of the chapters are specifically British in perspective, but several raise issues for the alliance as a whole. For instance, Phil Williams argues that some new technologies-conventionally armed cruise and ballistic missiles in particular-might enhance deterrence but could also make escalation more rapid if war occurred. Thus, they would not raise the nuclear threshold in Europe; they might lower it.
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US public expectations of a 'peace dividend' from the collapse of the socialist bloc are unrealistic. Structural properties of US defence policy-making, and the non-existence of any strategic vision not predicated on the monolithic Soviet threat, mean that "for the next several years the 'peace dividend' will be much smaller than enthusiasts hope, and earning it will require departures from customary congressional habits". Offers advice on a strategy for reducing US defence expenditure (1) avoid a return to the 'hollow army' by shifting towards reserve or 'round-out' units (2) cut US forces in Europe in the light of CFE results, not in advance of them (3) defer various high-price equipment programmes, while preserving R&D budgets (4) using arms control to cut what the USA "can safely do without".
Washington wants to hire ex-Baathists to help rebuild Iraq. The CIA's experience using ex-Nazis to run West Germany's intelligence service should give it pause.
The Congress of Vienna, the Treaty of Versailles, and the NATO-based containment strategy were three pivotal decisions in European diplomacy. Now there is a fourth opportunity to construct a lasting European peace through institutions, new and old. Foremost, NATO must expand, discussing openly which new countries to admit. The Partnership for Peace and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe should coordinate human rights and civilian control of armies. Respect for human rights must extend to Russia, which is why the Chechen campaign has been so disturbing. To turn away from the challenge of this moment and freeze NATO would exact a higher price later.
