A Republican Looks at Foreign Policy
Reviews foreign policy issues confronting the USA from a Republican (i.e. generally conservative) angle. Calls for bi-partisanship in support of (1) ABM treaty plus SDI (or some variant thereof) (2) strengthening NATO (3) expanding the Reagan doctrine in the Third World to give political and economic support for market-oriented democracies. Cites the Philippines as a case where promotion of democracy and national security went hand-in-hand.
Senator Richard G. Lugar of Indiana was Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in 1985-86.
Recently it was suggested that presidential primaries drive Republican and Democratic hopefuls into making a mess of foreign policy: Republicans emphasize their suspicions about arms control agreements with the Soviets; Democrats rail against new weapons systems and any resort to the use of force to back up diplomacy. This commentary—an editorial in The Washington Post—concluded that the process of the primaries exacts a high cost in American foreign policy, and that it will not be easy for the next president to reclaim a middle ground laid waste by excessive partisan rhetoric.
But the middle can be variously defined. What will matter is how a new administration deals with the core issues of American security policy: arms control and national defense, the use of force, including U.S. military forces, abroad. Even these issues must first be addressed in the broad historical context of those enduring postwar commitments and responsibilities that both Republicans and Democrats have subscribed to since 1945.
If the new administration is to develop a cohesive and coherent foreign policy, it cannot escape the changes in our nation’s strategic position. It must recognize three fundamental new conditions. First, there is a potentially dangerous disparity developing between those vital security interests that the American people are prepared to support with force, and the degree and kind of force we are willing and able to employ to protect these interests. In short, our aims may exceed our resources.
The extent of American commitments abroad has not declined; in some parts of the world our obligations have even increased. This new reality has led some to argue once again that we must reduce our commitments and thereby decrease the risks our country must face. But it is far easier to demand a reduction in commitments than to define with clarity those commitments that can, in fact, be safely reduced. In practice, we must decide whether the loss of prestige from abdicating responsibilities will reduce the effective use of American power more than the reduced claims on our resources might enhance our standing.
This is a premium article
You must be a Foreign Affairs subscriber to continue reading. If you are already a print subscriber, click here to activate your online access.
Log In
Buy PDF
Buy a premium PDF reprint of this article.Related
The NATO nations are phasing out of existence the mass conscript armed force with vast mobilization reserves. This has profound and subtle implications for international relations and also for domestic civil- military relations. In the United States, one campaign promise that President Nixon sought to implement after he took office was to halt the draft as soon as possible and create an all-volunteer force. Paradoxically, the prolongation of hostilities in Vietnam served only to speed the end of conscription and develop congressional support for his campaign promise. Terminating conscription was one issue on which antiwar Congressmen and pressure groups could unite with the Nixon administration. The result was that Selective Service legislation will not extend beyond July 1, 1973, and that military officials plan to reach the objective of a "zero draft" call by January 1, 1973, at the latest.
Richard Holbrooke's gripping memoir shows how he improvised a makeshift peace in what was left of Bosnia despite a timorous Pentagon, a reluctant president, waweirding allies, and brutal ethnic cleansers. But the Dayton Accord came too late.
Russia's post-Soviet orientation is in serious trouble. The West does not want to see any structure in Eurasia that permits Russian hegemony, but abetting continued chaos in the former Soviet space is hardly in the West's interest. Central Asia and the Caucasus are rife with flash points that could ignite and draw in outside powers, and the presence of nuclear weapons raises the stakes even higher. The United States should support integration, not division. For its part, Russia should work with nearby countries to help unite diverse peoples in a stabler system.
