Gives details of both US and regional (Arias) initiatives for peace in Nicaragua, with a pessimistic view of the contras' ability to win either the war or an election. Considers US material support for contras to be 'virtually finished', and thus advocates a 'second-best solution' of containment of Sandinistas, by providing a non-intervention guarantee, and seeking democratization of Nicaragua. A slightly misleading title, since almost all the article is taken up with the war in Nicaragua and US involvement, with only a brief reference to El Salvador.
Linda S. Robinson, Associate Editor of Foreign Affairs, visited Central America in 1986 and 1987.
As 1987 began, the United States was reeling from the revelations of the Iran-contra affair. A series of investigations consumed most of the year and much of the time and attention of the public and government alike. Despite the scandal, during most of the year the Nicaraguan rebels, or contras, continued to receive a $100-million, congressionally approved aid package to escalate their war. The battle over whether to renew such aid promised to be the focal point of the region in 1987. Yet by August all five Central American countries had signed a regional peace plan in Guatemala City.
How did we get from investigations and guerrilla war to "give peace a chance" in just a few months? The surprise conclusion of the pact in Guatemala resulted from extensive maneuverings which took place out of the limelight of the Iran-contra investigations. The Iran-contra hearings starkly displayed how divided Congress and the Reagan Administration were over U.S. policy toward Nicaragua, and this division gave a crucial impetus to the diplomatic effort. But the hearings, while a prominent forum, did not resolve the debate over Nicaragua. They focused on finding out exactly what had been done in the name of the U.S. government by a few National Security Council officials, private citizens and some CIA personnel.
Public support for the contras surged briefly after the televised testimony of former NSC aide Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, but a month later substantially less than half of those surveyed favored continued aid. Public opinion seemed roughly unchanged by the endless testimony, but more Americans did come to know which side their government supported in Nicaragua.
At any rate, the scandal did not cause an immediate backlash against the contras. Congress did not take an opportunity to cut off funding to the rebels in March when it voted on the final installment of the $100 million, for heavy artillery. The Senate vote was close (48-52), but votes on contra aid had been close even before the Democrats won control of the chamber in the November 1986 elections. The House did not vote on a strict cutoff measure, but rather voted (230-196) to withhold the last $40 million until the Administration accounted for previous aid. It constituted less than a rejection of contra aid, although some said it was a warning that a future request would not pass.
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Uses the example of Nicaragua to argue for selective containment of Soviet expansion and influence under the 'Reagan doctrine'. The Contras should be supported.
The USA maintains that its aim is for a peaceful settlement in Nicaragua in a regional context that advances the prospects for democracy, protects the interests of the Contras and preserves US strategic interests. These goals involve a potentially long and difficult process. The accord concluded by the Central American Presidents in Aug 1987 by no means ensures peace. The practical question facing the USA is how to preserve its commitment to the Contras while still influencing the negotiating process.
Recent and forthcoming elections in key Latin American countries come at a time when US relations with many states in the region are particularly uncertain. Discusses six areas which should be addressed by policy-makers (1) the debt crisis (2) the need for co-operation between the USA, Europe, Canada and Latin American countries in ending Central America's wars (3) support of democratic institutions (4) the drug problem (5) the need to rebuild inter-American institutions (6) relations with Mexico and Panama. Concludes that too much attention has been devoted to Nicaragua at the expense of greater concerns, although straightforward solutions are unlikely. Former US ambassador to the Organization of American States, and co-negotiator of the Panama Canal treaties. A substantial criticism of Reagan's policy in Central and South America, and interesting for its view of both regions as one.
