Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance; The Limited Partnership: Europe, The United States, and the Burdens of Alliance
Just when it again seemed that everything to be said about the West European-American alliance had been said, two important books appear, together framing the central issue sharply. Calleo's thesis is straightforward: under NATO, "the Europeans have been militarily underdeveloped while the United States has been militarily overextended." The answer is orderly devolution to Western Europe of more responsibility for its own defense, an argument Calleo has made on other grounds in earlier works. If the underlying argument is overdrawn-with decent economic management there is no reason why the United States cannot afford to spend six percent of its GNP on defense, although its citizens may choose not to-its central argument is more and more in fashion and needs to be confronted. For Joffe, a German who is culturally and even politically close to America, NATO is neither as "parasitic" to the United States nor as "oppressive" to European self-reliance as Calleo implies. Joffe is less optimistic than Calleo about a Western Europe with a diminished American role: he is less confident that Europe has transcended its history; by sparing Europeans "the necessity of self-reliant choice in matters of defense, the United States banished the systemic cause of conflict at the root of so many of Europe's past wars."
Related
One vital benefit which is struggling to emerge from the prolonged debate about President Reagan's military budget proposals is a recognition that this country and its NATO allies have until now, incredibly, lacked a meaningful and coherent strategy of defense against the Soviet Union. Appreciation of this fact may not yet fully have penetrated the Pentagon or been recognized by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. But it does appear to have reached the White House. The first indication of this came in a little noticed but potentially vastly important statement made by William P. Clark, the President's National Security Adviser, at Georgetown University last May 20. Our new strategy, he declared, would include "diplomatic, political, economic and informational components built on a foundation of military strength." In a limited application of this concept, he noted that "We must force our principal adversary, the Soviet Union, to bear the brunt of its economic shortcomings."
In Afghanistan, the Bush administration seemed determined at first to keep NATO on the sidelines. Now, as war with Iraq looms and the alliance ponders its own future, the president needs to reaffirm his commitment to the organization by including NATO in any new operation from the beginning. If not, its future relevance may come into question.
In recent months, many observers have concluded that the United States and Europe are on divergent paths and that the transatlantic alliance is crumbling. In spite of some real differences, however, American and European attitudes remain remarkably similar on most key issues. Basing policy on the false assumption of transatlantic divorce would only make it a self-fulfilling prophecy.
