The Iran-Iraq War and Western Security, 1984-87; Constraints on U.S. Strategy in Third World Conflicts; Superpower Competition and Security in the Third World
Cordesman's careful chronology of what is probably the bloodiest war of the postwar era helps us understand why that war has gone on so long. His policy suggestions are thoughtful reminders that the West should be seeking to end the war on the right terms, not gloating over its prolongation, and that we have been dangerously misled by the oil glut to disregard energy planning. Hosmer's book is narrower than its title suggests-it is about constraints on U.S. military operations-but it is a useful survey of historical experience as seen through the eyes of policymakers: what constrained them, especially their concerns about Soviet reactions, and what induced them to relax the constraint? The Litwak-Wells volume, the product of a series of seminars at the Wilson Center in Washington, seeks to engage perspectives that rarely connect-those who see the roots of Third World insecurity in superpower or East-West terms and those who give pride of place to indigenous regional factors-and does so with an outstanding group of authors.
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"Dual containment" is shot through with dangerous inconsistencies and flaws. It assumes that either the regional status quo in the Middle East will endure or the United States will be able to stage-manage a change of regime in Iraq, while keeping Iran from being a spoiler of stability. Dual containment now pushes Iran and Iraq closer together despite their history of hostility. An end to the futile U.S. economic embargo of Iran and a diplomatic dialogue to assuage Iran's fears of hostile encirclement would make for a better policy.
Every president since Richard Nixon has recognized that ensuring stability in the Persian Gulf is a vital U.S. interest. In its first term, the Clinton administration attempted to deal with the twin dangers of Iran and Iraq through a strategy of "dual containment" that kept both countries boxed in with economic sanctions and military monitoring. Dual containment, however, is more a slogan than a strategy, and far too blunt an instrument to serve American interests in the Middle East. The United States must employ a more nuanced approach, keeping the straitjacket on Saddam while seeking improved relations with Iran.
The Middle East that awaits the Clinton administration is a locus of terrorism, drugs, refugees, armaments and oil. Iran, newly pragmatic on domestic and economic issues, is not inclined toward cooperation with either its neighbors or the wider world. Iraq's Saddam Hussein wasted no time in testing the resolve of the incoming American president. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia find an increasingly educated middle class seeking a greater voice in the political process. Turkey, after half a century of avoiding outside entanglements, is a country at risk. The former Soviet republics of Central Asia are newly relevant to American policy, with Muslim fundamentalism on the rise and the nuclear arsenal of Kazakhstan still intact.
