The Strategic Defense Initiative: Shield Or Snare; Star Wars: The Economic Fallout; Strategic Defense and Arms Control; Star Wars and European Defence
For anyone who has missed the SDI debate and wants to catch up, the Brown volume is a useful primer. In their careful chapter on the macroeconomics of SDI, Barry Blechman and Victor Utgoff estimate the opportunity cost of a comprehensive defense as equivalent to a $570 annual tax surcharge for citizens earning $30,000 to $50,000. The Nimroody book, the result of a Council on Economic Priorities project, presents a still sharper conclusion, arguing that the Reagan SDI program "harbors . . . serious threats to the economy," especially if early contracts build political momentum behind the program. Weinberg and Barkenbus make clear their moral preference for a defense-dominated nuclear world-specifically for a defense-protected arms build-down-but they are fair-minded enough to report their surprise that not all their contributors agreed; indeed their own epilogue is as good a synthesis of the defense-offense arguments as there is anywhere. The Brauch volume disaggregates the European reaction to SDI in country-by-country chapters-helpful source material, if probably more than most readers will need.
Related
The basic assumptions of U.S. policy toward the Gulf demand rethinking. The Pentagon pays up to $60 billion a year to protect the import of $30 billion worth of oil that would flow anyway. Playing the role of regional hegemon ties America to troubled regimes and leaves it out on a limb, while allies sit back. Washington must hedge against inevitable political change in the region by spreading the burden and the say, reversing arms proliferation, and encouraging the Gulf states to come up with some security of their own.
Twice before, America had the opportunity to make the prevention of conflict its first line of defense. It must not lose this moment after the Cold War to foment a revolution in security strategy. Preventing proliferation is key, and U.S. programs help turn Soviet missile sites into sunflower fields. The American armed services, the world's most emulated, show other militaries how to function in a civil society and conduct exchanges that head off misunderstandings. In Europe, George Marshall's fondest hopes are being realized through the Partnership for Peace, which reverberates well beyond the security realm. Meanwhile, the United States leverages forces for maximum deterrence and invests in smart technology. But its best investment is in openness and trust, the essential tools of the art of peace.
Nuclear weapons were used for the first and only time in World War II, and the world has grown accustomed to their nonuse. But the overwhelming deterrent forces that worked during the Cold War will not provide protection against the new threats: terrorism and catastrophic accident. The arsenals and mindsets of the past half-century present a formidable barrier to change, but the United States must lead the way in preventing nuclear weapons from becoming acceptable.
