The USA should not trust Gorbachev, even if over 70% of Americans do. Praises the Reagan administration's defence policies and arms control posture of increasing military strength "to secure real arms reductions". In negotiating with the Soviets it is necessary to bargain from strength and to have patience. Backs SDI as making the world safer and calls for NATO modernization. US secretary of defense, 1981-87.
Caspar W. Weinberger was Secretary of Defense from 1981 to November 1987. Copyright © 1988 by Caspar W. Weinberger.
We're sorry, but Foreign Affairs does not have the copyright to display this article online.
Related
Although President Nixon's goal of achieving an initial agreement at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) before the end of 1971 failed to be realized, it still appears likely that at least some limitations will be negotiated by the time that he and Premier Kosygin meet in Moscow in May. After SALT recessed in Vienna the President reported in his state of the world message on February ninth that a consensus is developing that there should be a treaty setting comprehensive limitations on anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) and an interim agreement to freeze certain offensive arms.
Despite a decline in share (from 85% in the 1960s to 68% now) the superpowers still dominate international arms transfers. If they choose not to sell to a combatant, he is forced into the black or grey market, which offers less advanced systems. Combatants are also affected by human factors, economic constraints, the need for large fast deliveries which only the superpowers can meet -- which is also true of satellite intelligence. Dependency is sustained by the need for modern, major systems, access to technological innovation and the need for support (financial, military, political). Explains how military aid has been a useful foreign policy tool.
Calls for a more pragmatic judgment of the technological implications of military trends. Reviews significance of strategic defence, ICBMs and counterforce, targeting, basing, SLBMs and cruise missiles. Recommends "specific bilateral agreements and judicious unilateral choices in force modernization".
