Lessons of the INF Treaty

The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, signed by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev on December 8, 1987, is certainly a success if measured against the West’s proclaimed arms control objectives during the 1980s. In the face of opposition from both the Soviet Union and West European peace movements, NATO carried out its 1979 decision to deploy intermediate-range nuclear missiles in five West European countries. Later, after the deployment was completed, NATO succeeded in securing Soviet agreement to all of its arms control goals, including the global elimination of Soviet SS-20 missiles and acceptance of very intrusive verification measures.

Nevertheless, the INF treaty has provoked considerable unease in the West, by its provisions as well as by its implications for the future. Will NATO’s strategy of flexible response remain credible? Will the imbalance between conventional forces in Europe now become more dangerous? Will the treaty unleash political forces leading to the denuclearization of the continent and American disengagement from NATO? It would be both ironic and tragic if this NATO success became the vehicle for a future alliance crisis.

The story of the negotiation of the INF treaty is well known. What is important now is to consider the critical lessons of the INF experience.

II

The INF saga began in the late 1970s as a result of two West European worries. First, the Soviets were deploying new SS-20 missiles, which were mobile, accurate, equipped with multiple warheads, and targeted on Western Europe. Second, the Americans were ignoring European interests in negotiating the second Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) Treaty, seeking limits only on the nuclear threat to the United States. President Carter’s inept handling of the neutron bomb affair in 1978 exacerbated European concern, rekindling doubts about the American commitment to Europe and the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee.

Finding it difficult to address these underlying doubts directly, West Europeans and Americans focused on confronting the expansion of the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe and the deficiencies in the U.S. nuclear arsenal in Europe. In 1979 NATO decided to modernize its nuclear capabilities by deploying 572 Pershing 2 and ground-launched cruise missiles, and simultaneously to begin negotiations to reduce the Soviet SS-20 threat.