The Dollar and the Defense of the West
US economic problems require defence spending cuts, since civilian programmes cannot be cut nor taxes raised, and these issues thus have a geopolitical dimension. Europe must therefore assume primary responsibility for its own defence, thus "sustaining the Pax Americana from which all have profited so handsomely".
David P. Calleo is Professor and Director of European Studies at The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies; Harold van B. Cleveland is an economic consultant based in Paris, and Leonard Silk is Economics Columnist for The New York Times.
The world economic system is in deep trouble. The threat to the international economic system has been a long time in the making: the growth of the world economy has depended overwhelmingly on the strength of the U.S. economy and the dollar. Paradoxically, many have thought growth depends on continuous dollar deficits, the source of growing monetary reserves believed essential to expanding world trade. But others have long feared that this dependence on the dollar points toward eventual disaster. Three decades ago Robert Triffin warned that a strong dollar and chronic U.S. payments deficits could not indefinitely coexist. Either the dollar would weaken and the system would break down, or the American payments deficit would end, the supply of monetary reserves would contract and economic expansion of the system would cease.
But no purely economic explanation for today’s gathering crisis is adequate. All along, U.S. deficits have been in large measure a consequence of America’s willingness to carry the heaviest share of the defense burdens of the noncommunist world. An end to the American deficits suggests an end to the American burdens. This gives the present financial crisis a geopolitical and historical dimension. It appears a crisis, not only of the dollar, but of American "hegemony" and of the global political economy which that hegemony has built. This creates the grim possibility that the United States, the country that created the postwar global economy, is now on a course fated to destroy it. As Professor Paul Kennedy’s recent book reminds us, history is full of examples of hegemonic powers that brought themselves down because they were unable to sustain a viable relationship between geopolitical pretensions and economic resources. His is an ancient and recurrent lesson among historical moralists: a country with too-great power grows overextended and then self-destructive.
If this course is to be averted, it must be understood that the solution to America’s dollar problem is not purely economic but also geopolitical. Furthermore, the adjustments needed cannot be made by the United States alone, but must also involve its major allies. There are few alternatives: the current method of financing the Pax Americana makes a weak and fluctuating dollar inevitable and has increasingly destructive consequences for the world economy.
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Only a few years ago pundits were sure that the United States was losing to Asia and Europe and had to emulate their more state- directed economies to remain competitive. Now the conventional wisdom is that America is number one and that the rest of the world should adopt its more laissez-faire approach. In fact, neither caricature is right. Asia was booming and now it is slumping, but it will be back. Europe's underlying ossification will persist. But most important, while the U.S. economy is in a period of robust growth, nothing fundamental has changed. Its long-run growth rate has not accelerated, productivity has not risen, and the structural unemployment rate has fallen by one percentage point at most. Come the next recession, all this triumphalism will seem silly.
America's economy is in its eighth year of sustained growth, transcending the German and Japanese "miracles." This is no fluke. America's unique brand of entrepreneurial capitalism is based on a series of advantages that explain the stunning success of the 1990s and provide the basis for extending this winning streak. These strengths include deft managers, technological innovation, and a culture that values rugged individualism -- all fueled by finance capital that can nimbly meet the needs of a globalized, rapidly changing economy. Furthermore, the era of the deficit is over. Pessimists who warn of inflation should be ignored; American business leaders understand that today's low level of inflation is self-perpetuating. America's prosperity is structural, not transient, and its lead over Europe and Asia will only widen with time. America had the twentieth century. It will also have the twenty-first.
In recent years, American policy at home and abroad has seemed more pressed by events and less sure of its responses than at any time since the late 1940s. Since World War II, the guiding ideals of policy have been neo-Keynesian "full-employment" at home and neo-Wilsonian leadership abroad. It is difficult to count the achievements unimpressive. Along with an unparalleled domestic prosperity, America's leadership and power have coaxed the world into a structure of collective security and liberal economic interdependence--a pax Americana that has been, on balance, the happiest era of this troubled century. The present disarray of American policy arises from two broad trends that have increasingly undermined both its domestic and foreign achievements. The first is the apparently relentless acceleration of domestic inflation--a process that involves increasingly violent swings of the business cycle and a progressive stagnation of real growth and competitiveness. The second is the deterioration of American power abroad and, with it, the disintegration of the pax Americana.
