The accords were signed in 1988 by Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the USA and USSR as 'states guarantors'. They preclude Pakistani assistance to the Afghan resistance, but do not mention the Soviet involvement other than stating a timetable for troop withdrawals, whilst a voluntary repatriation of refugees is to be effected within a stated period. Gives detailed background to their signature. Charges that Afghanistan has been 'sovietized' so that the regime will not fall apart. Warns of a "repetition of the Ethiopian tragedy" in respect of the refugees. The accords have provided for "the long-term Soviet consolidation of control".
Rosanne Klass is Director of the Afghanistan/Southwest Asia Center of Freedom House in New York, editor of AfghanistanThe Great Game Revisited, and author of an earlier book on the Afghans.
On April 14, 1988, in Geneva, representatives of the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan signed three bilateral agreements intended to end the war in Afghanistan. An additional "Declaration on International Guarantees" was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union as states-guarantors. Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze also signed one of the three bilateral agreements as witnesses.
These documents, collectively known as the Geneva accords, have been hailed as the key to Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and a settlement of the conflict which has held the world spotlight since the Soviet invasion of December 1979. They have also been condemned by critics as a betrayal of the Afghan people and their ten-year struggle against communist domination.
The accords came into force on May 15, the date specified for the beginning of the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The documents do not, however, deal directly with the Soviet presence in Afghanistan per se. This is consistent with the insistence of both the Soviet Union and its Kabul client that the Soviet-installed regime is the lawful government of Afghanistan, and that any Soviet involvement in Afghanistan is a purely internal matter to be determined by that government on the basis of bilateral arrangements between two sovereign states.
II
The first of the bilateral agreements between Pakistan and Afghanistan, "Principles of Mutual Relations, in particular on Non-Interference and Non-Intervention," binds the two parties to refrain from various specified activities that could constitute interference in one another’s affairs. Its detailed clauses (Article II, paragraphs 1-13) effectively close off every means by which Pakistan could assist, or could permit its territory to be used to assist, the Afghan resistance. On the other hand, it does not specifically mention in any way the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, or indeed any form of Soviet involvement. Both the Soviet Union and the Kabul regime insist that the agreement applies only to outside assistance to forces opposed to the regime, i.e., the Afghan resistance; this definition appears to have been adopted in the accords.
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The two key issues are development aid levels and Pakistan's nuclear policy. On the first, argues that the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, plus US budget constraints, indicate that "extraordinarily high levels of aid cannot and should not be maintained". On the second, asserts that the USA should, if it proves unable to persuade Pakistan to renounce its nuclear programme, lower its sights and settle for Pakistani agreement not to test nuclear weapons.
Explains how (1) neither India nor Pakistan could expect to benefit from a war over Kashmir (2) nevertheless their pre-emptive defence postures create the risk of war breaking out through inadvertence, miscalculation or misperception.
With the Taliban resurgent, reconstruction faltering, and opium poppy cultivation at an all-time high, Afghanistan is at risk of collapsing into chaos. If Washington wants to save the international effort there, it must increase its commitment to the area and rethink its strategy -- especially its approach to Pakistan, which continues to give sanctuary to insurgents on its tribal frontier.
