The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis
Whilst Iran has made its three-to-one manpower advantage tell on the ground, it is nonetheless losing the war in the air as well as economically and diplomatically. Iran suffers both from logistical problems (e.g. spares for seven kinds of tank), ineffective doctrine and political control of the military. Iraq has mounted an effective economic blockade of its enemy and with 'de facto' support from both superpowers should defeat Iran within eighteen months. Includes a rationalization of Iraqi use of chemical weapons.
David Segal is a writer who specializes in military affairs.
The eighth year of the Iran-Iraq War is nearly over, but the conflict shows little sign of ending anytime soon. Despite the dramatic events of April, when U.S. and Iranian naval forces clashed in the Persian Gulf, 1988 appears destined to be just another year of bloody stalemate in a seemingly endless war.
Appearances, however, may be deceptive. In the course of the last year or so, Iraq has continued to make significant economic and diplomatic gains while holding its own militarily. Its clear edge in missiles and air power has made the "war of the cities" a decidedly one-sided contest. Much more importantly, with its recapture of the strategic Fao peninsula April 17-18, and despite serious setbacks in the north, Iraq may have actually managed to wrest the land initiative from Iran for the first time in six years.
To appreciate properly the significance of these developments, one must first understand the military situation that has prevailed since the Iranians drove the Iraqi invaders back behind their own borders in the summer of 1982. Since that time, Iran has been slowly winning the war on the ground, while losing it on the economic and diplomatic fronts.
That Iran, with an estimated 6.2 million men fit for military service out of a population of 45.2 million, could be winning a war of attrition against Iraq, whose 15.5 million population includes only 2.03 million men fit for duty, is hardly surprising. If anything, it is surprising that Iraq, despite over two dozen major Iranian offenses since 1982, has kept the numerically superior Iranians at bay for so long.
II
The combatants face each other along a 730-mile front from Turkey to the Persian Gulf. Since 1982 the front lines have approximately coincided with the international border.
This is a premium article
You must be a Foreign Affairs subscriber to continue reading. If you are already a print subscriber, click here to activate your online access.
Log In
Buy PDF
Buy a premium PDF reprint of this article.Related
The USA appears to be indifferent to the Gulf war, despite the implications of an Iranian victory. Arab leaders are concerned about the apparent 'tilt' in US policy away from Iraq, and are confused by McFarlane's dealings with the Khomeini regime. A more definite US policy is needed.
The Iran-Iraq war is now in its fourth year. For those of us in the West, the conflict has had a quality of remoteness for much of its course, an impression brought about in part by the nature of the struggle itself. We feel revulsion at a war that has sent teenagers by the thousands to their deaths against entrenched gun positions, at the use of poison gas which we had hoped the conscience of mankind had abolished as a method of warfare. We have been unable to comprehend fully the ideologies and motivations driving the leaders of these two nations to pursue a conflict that has led to such carnage and cynical disregard for human life. It has been easy-indeed a relief-to put this war out of mind. And besides, we ask, what can anybody do to bring it to an end?
By toppling Saddam Hussein, the Bush administration has liberated and empowered Iraq's Shiite majority and has helped launch a broad Shiite revival that will upset the sectarian balance in Iraq and the Middle East for years to come. This development is rattling some Sunni Arab governments, but for Washington, it could be a chance to build bridges with the region's Shiites, especially in Iran.
