U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation
These Stanford authors share their Harvard colleagues' premise that if the threat of nuclear Armageddon has been mostly responsible for preventing war between the superpowers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union ought to be able to turn their shared security interest into cooperation, tacit or explicit. This impressive volume mines the postwar history of such efforts in Europe, in arms control and in dealing with regional conflict. While the relationship is and will remain fundamentally conflicted-only in Europe have the two superpowers developed a set of assumptions and agreements that amount to a security regime-still, they share incentives to cooperate: each senses it is vulnerable to modern war and that unilateral measures to promote security are not enough. In the future, as in the past, explicit agreements are not always possible or necessary; instead, agreement takes the form of "a mix of unilateral policies and cooperative arrangements."
Related
US public expectations of a 'peace dividend' from the collapse of the socialist bloc are unrealistic. Structural properties of US defence policy-making, and the non-existence of any strategic vision not predicated on the monolithic Soviet threat, mean that "for the next several years the 'peace dividend' will be much smaller than enthusiasts hope, and earning it will require departures from customary congressional habits". Offers advice on a strategy for reducing US defence expenditure (1) avoid a return to the 'hollow army' by shifting towards reserve or 'round-out' units (2) cut US forces in Europe in the light of CFE results, not in advance of them (3) defer various high-price equipment programmes, while preserving R&D budgets (4) using arms control to cut what the USA "can safely do without".
U.S. spending on foreign policy--defense, aid, and diplomacy--has been halved since 1962, while entitlements grab evermore tax dollars. Congress should now be investing more in national security, not beggaring it for a peace dividend.
The recent troubles of the CIA date back to its early years, when dashing young men toyed with foreign governments. Evan Thomas evokes the time. Jeffrey T. Richelson catalogs the consequences.

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