Europe Without America?: The Crisis In Atlantic Relations
Why the coy question mark of the title-when it is also the prescription of this manifesto cum analysis? The author, former European editor of The Guardian based in Brussels, writes from the conviction (and perhaps the hope) that "the Atlantic Alliance . . . could now, in the later 1980s, be facing a period of potentially terminal decline." He also foresees "the slow decay of Atlanticism." Under these circumstances, an independent, unified and perhaps neutralized Europe should arise-something that only a new left is likely to achieve. Palmer is aware of the corruption and decline in Eastern Europe, but hopes for reforms and sees East European dissidents as favoring his hope for a new European order. An intelligent exposition of important minority views that would find themselves attracted to Gorbachev's invocation of "this common house, Europe." The book-despite its bias, oversimplification and occasional historical lapses-can be read as a useful challenge to any kind of complacent Atlanticism.
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The Clinton administration erred grievously in threatening intervention in the northern Balkans (Bosnia, Serbia, Croatia) and then quailing when it was needed. But in the southern Balkans (Macedonia, Albania, Greece, Turkey), U.S. diplomacy has been successful, particularly compared with the clownish efforts of European nations. Capable U.S. envoys have worked hard to reverse the growing polarization of Greece and Turkey. Moreover, U.S. support has helped reinforce the fragile geographic firewall, Macedonia, thus preventing a wider regional war.
Europeans were troubled by the setbacks of four successive presidents from Johnson to Carter, and thus Reagan's election was greeted with a sense of relief. Europeans were, furthermore, impressed by Reagan's ideas and his revitalizing of the US economy. One wonders how, in as august a journal as Foreign Affairs, political posturing manages to pass itself off as analysis. To discuss 'European attitudes' as if they were somehow homogeneous, even within a narrow band of national political elites, is hardly convincing. Moreover, some of the generalizations about Reagan's 'popularity' in Europe are not merely not supported by evidence, but also seem plainly unsupportable; it would be at least as plausible to suggest that the Reagan Doctrine, as well as the President's personal style, fragmented European attitudes to US foreign policy.
The two world wars are the mountain ranges that dominate the historical landscape of the twentieth century. We still live in their shadows, in America as well as in Europe. Only with these wars did European and American history begin to coincide. The revolutions of 1820, 1830, 1848 and the wars leading to the unification of Italy and Germany marked the nineteenth century in European history, while the major events in American history were the westward movement, the Civil War and mass immigration. These events had certain transatlantic connections, yet not decisive ones. But in the twentieth century the two world wars have been the main events in the history of Europe and America as well.

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