Criticizes "the failure of American policymakers to develop any concept or strategy for dealing with the 'new-thinking' Soviet leadership". Proposes that "the United States and its allies... reach beyond containment to aggressive engagement of the Soviet Union in ways that encourage Gorbachev's reformist instincts" by means of specific tests of his intentions in the fields of arms control, regional conflict and human rights.
Graham T. Allison, Jr., is Dean of Harvard Universitys John F. Kennedy School of Government. He is coauthor, with William Ury, of the forthcoming volume, Windows of Opportunity: From Cold War to Peaceful Competition.
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"The INF treaty singles out for elimination all land-based missiles of a specified range". Gives the background to the treaty from 1979. In effect it resulted from the USSR calling Reagan's bluff on his zero-option proposal of 1981. The consequence is that the West is on the defensive, lacking a coherent approach and compelled to proceed on the basis of its present policy. The lesson of the treaty is therefore for the West to define its long-term objectives, and the roles of the USA and Western Europe within them. US deputy assistant secretary for defense (policy plans), 1977-81.
Charts the ups and downs of Soviet-US relations in the run-up to the Reykjavik summit (including the Daniloff affair), the arms control proposals discussed there, and the political fall-out. SDI is seen as central to President Reagan's policy, contrary to the views of his officials. The events of the latter half of 1986 prove that the strategic relationship between the superpowers is a tenuous one, but that it is not founded on the classic principles of international relations because of the nuclear question. Common security must be the target for the future. Sets out the limits for US-Soviet relationship -- limits to how good, and how bad, it can be.
Written in anticipation of the third summit and the signing of the INF treaty, concludes that Gorbachev has adopted a basically defensive strategy and seems prepared to settle for a prolonged stalemate in terms of strategic superiority to the USA. This leads him to seek arms control agreements as a means of codifying his assumptions about security and the nuclear relationship. Washington's policy of selective containment is balanced by Moscow's policy of selective commitment.
