Seeks to explain the failure of democracy in Haiti after Duvalier by reference to economic and historical factors. Haiti is a (1) "rural fastness" suffering from land erosion, lack of natural resources and a 90% illiteracy rate (2) a country which, since its revolution at the end of the 18th century, has been far more often ruled than governed. "The case for helping Haiti is overwhelming ... but exactly how and when to help are still open questions".
Robert I. Rotberg is Academic Vice President for Arts, Sciences, and Technology of Tufts University. Until 1987, he was professor of political science and history at M.I.T.
Democracy, fair elections, toleration of dissent, multi-party government, checks and balances, constitutions and the rule of law are all foreign to Haiti, the sick man of the hemisphere and the United States’ close neighbor. This summer Lieutenant General Henri Namphy, Haiti’s current strongman and the head of a military junta that has ruled the demi-island nation since dictator Jean-Claude (Baby Doc) Duvalier was forced to flee in February 1986, ousted President Leslie F. Manigat and tore up the country’s post-Duvalier constitution. "Constitutions are not for Haiti," Namphy said.
II
The Duvalier family, father and son, had run Haiti like a feudal fiefdom for nearly 30 years. Although Baby Doc was less indiscriminately cruel than François (Papa Doc), his father, he maintained a predatory state which terrorized Haitians and returned very little to most of his countrymen. The junta—Namphy, Major General Williams Regala, Brigadier General Prosper Avril and Colonel Jean-Claude Paul—all soldiered for the Duvaliers, and had ties to the corrupt and rapacious elements who used Haiti for private gain. But as officers in the army their role individually and collectively was less central to the dominance of the Duvaliers than the dreaded tonton macoutes, a group of henchmen that functioned as a secret police.
Indeed, the Duvaliers largely shunted the soldiers aside, until the last Duvalier was himself forced out by a massive, popular outpouring of revulsion similar to that which rid the Philippines of Ferdinand Marcos during the same month. Baby Doc’s ouster, aided by a final, vital push by resident U.S. diplomats, permitted the long ignored and despised army to reclaim the power it had lost in Haiti in 1957, with the end of the dictatorial regime of General Paul E. Magloire and the rise of Papa Doc. Unlike its Philippine counterpart, Haiti’s army had not been instrumental in Duvalier’s departure. The junta declared itself an interim government to supervise a transition to democracy, and received the United States’ blessing for this purpose.
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We still have much to do to adapt our arrangements for administering foreign aid to the fact that a successful aid program must be a process of partnership. Foreign aid is not something a donor does for or to a recipient; it is something to be done with a recipient. This is the reason for the growing emphasis on self-help by aid recipients. There is by now a strong consensus-although far from complete unanimity-that foreign aid in all its forms will produce maximum results only in so far as it is related to maximum self-help. This is the opinion of leading public officials and development scholars in developing countries as well as in advanced countries.
U.S. and international development agencies, believing that poor countries should develop economically before they become democratic, have not taken politics into account when disbursing aid. This is a mistake: poor democracies are almost always stronger, calmer, and more caring than poor autocracies, because they allow power to be shared and encourage openness and accountability. They deserve all the help they can get.
Of all our foreign aid programs, the one which probably excites the greatest concern currently is the Alliance for Progress, that enterprise dedicated to promoting economic and social progress in Latin America. Agricultural land reform and improvement in the conditions of rural life are prominent among the measures advocated by the Alliance. Through these it is hoped that revolutionary ferment can be channeled into evolutionary development. At this time, when the direction of the Alliance is under review, we should consider whether these measures are the ones most suitable to achieve the stated goals, or whether other measures, presently subordinated, hold greater promise for success.
