French Foreign Policy: The Challenge of Adaptation

1CommentsJoin

Sign-up for free weekly updates from ForeignAffairs.com.

Seven years ago, the election of a Socialist as president of France caused anxiety among France’s allies. The inclusion of Communist ministers into the French government, radical domestic changes and strong pro-Third World commitments initially aroused anxious suspicions, only gradually dissipated by President François Mitterrand’s hard-line approach toward the Soviet Union and his firmness during the Euromissile crisis.

In 1988 by contrast, the reelection of Mitterrand and the installation of a Socialist-led governing coalition headed by Prime Minister Michel Rocard has been greeted with relief. To the outside world as well as to a majority of Frenchmen, Mitterrand appears as a more statesmanlike and reassuring leader than his conservative former prime minister, Jacques Chirac. After all, during the week prior to the election on May 8, Chirac’s government had managed to reawaken all the old international prejudices about France’s national arrogance and selfishness. As seen from Western capitals, Chirac was simultaneously negotiating with terrorists in the Middle East to obtain the release of French hostages, paving the way for a neocolonial war in New Caledonia and betraying his international promises by prematurely allowing Dominique Prieur, one of the secret agents who in 1985 had sabotaged an antinuclear protest ship, to return from punitive exile.

But even the feeling of domestic and international relief at Mitterrand’s reelection cannot completely assuage the combination of perplexity and uncertainty with which the world regards France’s international role. As France enters the second half of what will probably be described by historians as the "Mitterrand era," can she confront the political and economic challenge of joining a united Europe? Is France’s desire to be a global mini-superpower compatible with her desire to cooperate in the European Community?

In 1981, foreign policy matters, though far from predominant, had been present in the election campaign; President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing had suffered from his unfortunate and untimely meeting with Leonid Brezhnev following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In 1988 foreign policy debates were conspicuously absent from the campaign, as if to shield the ambiguous consensus among the political elite and express the general public’s lack of interest.