Iran And The United States: A Cold War Case Study
A severe critique of U.S. policy toward Iran since World War II, somewhat similar to that of James Bill (whose The Eagle and the Lion was noted in Foreign Affairs, Summer 1988). Cottam, an authority on Iranian nationalism, points out again and again how American diplomats and political leaders, mesmerized by the cold war with the Russians, ignored or misinterpreted both reality and the Iranian view of reality. Much in the record of U.S.-Iranian relations is controversial, as are some of Cottam's arguments, but his book shows a deep understanding of Iranian history and politics.
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The summer of 1987 was unusually hot. To the Reagan White House it must have also seemed unusually long, for the Administration's basic competence in the conduct of foreign policy was on public trial, day after day, on national television.
Iran is the one sore spot in an otherwise highly cooperative German-American relationship. The United States has sought to punish the Islamic state for sponsoring terrorism. Germany has tried to maintain a "critical dialogue" of limited diplomacy and commerce, much as its Ostpolitik tried to engage Soviet bloc nations during the Cold War. U.S. officials decry Germany's shady dealings and billions of dollars in loans and credits to Iran. When challenged, German officials charge the United States with hypocrisy. Lurking behind the dispute is an uncomfortable fact: in a world without the Cold War, "rogue states" are not threatening enough to force accord among Western nations.
So far, the Bush administration has shown it would like to resolve its problems with North Korea and Iran the same way it did with Iraq: through regime change. It is easy to see why. But the strategy is unlikely to work, at least not quickly enough. A much broader approach -- involving talks, sanctions, and the threat of force -- is needed.

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