U.S. Policy And The Two Koreas
The author is worried about the future of U.S.-Korean relations. The U.S. is overburdened strategically and it must either shed, share or reduce its burdens. In Korea the U.S. cannot get rid of its burdens safely; consequently it must share responsibilities. But a "recurrent strain of isolationist and America-first attitudes" seems to be emerging in the U.S. The roots of this phenomenon include: frustration with nuclear confrontation, annoyance with allies, identification with the "Vietnam syndrome," anxiety about the foreign economic challenge. Collectively, "these attitudes may impair U.S. relations with Korea." And as the U.S. turns inward, Europeans and Asians may also look more to their own interests and capabilities. This would be worrisome because despite much rhetoric about the Pacific community, "nothing in the Pacific approaches the cohesive qualities of the North Atlantic."
Related
Since the end of World War II, there have been three watersheds in Sino-Soviet relations. In February 1950, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China formed an alliance against the West. In the late 1950s, there was the beginning of the historic split between them that transformed international politics. Then, in the early 1970s, there began the Sino-American rapprochement that, by the end of the decade, completely altered the strategic landscape and led to an incipient Chinese-American alliance against the Soviet Union.
As a European, and particularly as a Briton, I had the unusual good fortune to come first to Asia by way of America. The African and Indian friendships formed during college days at Oxford whetted my appetite for an understanding of the non-white world, but only when I arrived at Berkeley for a postgraduate year did I enter the life of the Chinese, the Japanese, the Filipinos, the Indonesians-who were there by the score, sharing with me the experience of being a foreign student in the United States.
American optimism about East Asia, in precious short supply only a few years earlier, was abundantly available in 1980. "The arc from Korea through Taiwan and the Philippines, at the very center of great power rivalry for much of this century, is less subject to these strains today than at any time in well over forty years," Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke declared in June. Such pronouncements by U.S. policymakers were understandable: East Asia offered far more possibilities--for diplomatic overtures, for expanding trade--than anyone dared predict during the Vietnam era. But in 1980 enough warning signals were flashing throughout the region to suggest the need for a more balanced--and less buoyant--assessment.

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