The central concern of US foreign policy -- relations with the USSR -- could be derailed by stakes in lesser countries, namely South Korea, the Philippines, Panama, and some states in Central America. Assesses each 'danger zone', and concludes that Bush cannot "postpone the reckoning ahead".
James Chace is the Director of the Program on International Affairs and the Media at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs, and the co-author most recently of America Invulnerable. He is currently writing a study of U.S. policy toward Asia and a biography of Dean Acheson. Kate Doyle assisted in the research for this article.
As it has for the past four decades, the American-Soviet relationship will dominate the foreign policy of the next administration. This is as it should be. The Bush Administration takes office at a culminating point in American diplomatic history. If the Soviets are serious in the foreign policy proposals they have put forth during the second Reagan Administration, the next president could well negotiate the terms of the post cold-war era. Unfortunately, there are grave foreign political problems outside the East-West context that could derail the efforts of the new administration to explore the limits of a U.S.-Soviet rapprochement.
Time and again we have seen how an administration can be consumed by issues that have little if any connection with those central concerns of U.S. foreign policy that are embodied in the East-West axis. Two recent examples are the Carter Administration’s Iran hostage crisis and the Reagan Administration’s Iran-contra affair. There are, after all, a number of countries to which we are closely tied by historical experience and interests. At times because of domestic political considerations, at other times for security reasons, Americans cannot remain indifferent to what happens in those places. These countries and their problems are inescapable entanglements. If left unattended, they could engulf an administration.
Some trouble spots do not threaten consequences of this magnitude for U.S. policy. In the cases of South Africa, Haiti and Israel, for example, there are constituencies here at home that require Washington to pay the closest attention to internal political developments there. But while the United States should press for racial equality in South Africa, for democracy in Haiti and for a settlement that will satisfy the requirements both of Palestinian nationalism and of Israeli security, in none of these cases is it likely that American troops will be involved. No convincing case can be made that U.S. security is threatened.
A very different situation exists in South Korea, the Philippines, Panama and Central America. In recognition of the stakes involved, U.S. troops are stationed there—about 40,000 in South Korea, some 18,000 in the Philippines, about 10,000 in Panama, about 1,000 in Honduras and over 100 advisers in El Salvador. These are all inescapable entanglements.
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After more than 50 years of dominating Northeast Asian diplomacy, Washington must now accommodate the fallout from the historic rapprochement between North and South Korea. As regional leaders take the reins of diplomacy, they face an uncertain future and lack the institutions that could guide the transition. The next U.S. administration can help, but not until it rethinks its own regional policies.
Covers US foreign policy in Latin America during 1988, discussing (1) Nicaragua (2) Panama and the Noriega problem (3) drug trafficking (4) the progress towards democracy (5) the debt crisis. Concludes that future US policy will have to centre around Mexico and the Caribbean basin, but that this should not obscure America's long-term interest in a steadily-improving economic situation throughout Latin America.
Recent and forthcoming elections in key Latin American countries come at a time when US relations with many states in the region are particularly uncertain. Discusses six areas which should be addressed by policy-makers (1) the debt crisis (2) the need for co-operation between the USA, Europe, Canada and Latin American countries in ending Central America's wars (3) support of democratic institutions (4) the drug problem (5) the need to rebuild inter-American institutions (6) relations with Mexico and Panama. Concludes that too much attention has been devoted to Nicaragua at the expense of greater concerns, although straightforward solutions are unlikely. Former US ambassador to the Organization of American States, and co-negotiator of the Panama Canal treaties. A substantial criticism of Reagan's policy in Central and South America, and interesting for its view of both regions as one.
