Discusses (1) the size of Soviet military forces (nuclear, naval, air and ground) (2) the ideological drive behind Soviet defence policy (3) possible future doctrinal developments. Since the late 1970s, changing technology has stimulated doctrinal change, giving rise to concepts of multi-front operations. But the doctrinal vision is at the moment unrealisable, and the Soviets may thus be seeking to reduce nuclear arsenals, so as to make defence of the rear easier in wartime. Concludes that, in the light of the continuing ideological basis of Soviet doctrine, the West must be careful not to underestimate the danger which lies behind the undermining of deterrence through badly-conceived arms control measures. Director, National Security Agency, 1985-88. Very useful analysis, recommended.
Lieutenant General William E. Odom, U.S. Army, Retired, is a director of national security studies at the Hudson Institute. He was Director of the National Security Agency from 1985 to 1988.
In the 1970s the Soviet Union won recognition as a full-fledged superpower. By the 1980s, however, some observers revised that judgment, calling it "a one-dimensional superpower," possessing only the military dimension. Whatever the validity of the new assessments of Soviet economic and political power, physical indices alone confirm the cogency of the new view of Soviet military power. No state in the world rivals the U.S.S.R. in its combination of size, sophistication and command and control of military forces.
—Soviet ground forces are composed of more than two hundred divisions, all mechanized, and organized under army, front and high commands in at least five theaters of military operations. They possess more than 53,000 main battle tanks, 48,000 tubes of artillery, mortars and multiple-rocket launchers, 4,600 surface-to-air missiles and 4,500 helicopters.
—The air forces include more than 4,900 tactical aircraft. Air defense forces have an additional 1,760 interceptor aircraft, 9,000 surface-to-air missile launchers, and 10,000 warning systems including satellites, radars and air surveillance systems. Under the terms of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the world’s only ABM system has been deployed around Moscow.
—The Soviet navy has 360 attack and cruise missile submarines, 274 principal surface combatants, and its own air arm of 390 bombers and 195 fighter aircraft.
—The bulk of the strategic nuclear forces is controlled by the strategic rocket forces, with 1,418 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and, until the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty is fully implemented, 553 medium-range ballistic missiles. The navy has an additional 967 submarine-launched ballistic missiles in 76 submarines, and the air force contributes 1,182 bombers.
—Command and control facilities are hardened, numerous and supported by multiple communications modes.
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