Charts the development of US foreign policy efforts under Reagan in (1) the Angolan conflict (2) South Africa. Since 1981, the US assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Chester A Crocker, has pursued two main objectives in Africa (1) the reduction of Soviet/Cuban influence and cross-border conflict (2) the introduction of more liberal policies in South Africa.
John A. Marcum is Professor of Politics and Chair of International Programs at the University of California, Santa Cruz. He is the author of a two-volume study, The Angolan Revolution.
For Africa, this decade has been a period of ominous economic, social and environmental decline. In 1980 depressed world commodity prices, declining agricultural production, ravaging drought and desertification, rising external debt, and both civil and interstate warfare portended continent-wide disaster. Throughout the 1980s per capita income fell from a level already the lowest in two decades. Decreasing financial reserves forced cuts in vital imports, including an eight-percent cut in 1987 alone. As the value of African exports continued to fall, from $57 billion in 1980 to $32 billion in 1986, one African statesman, the former Nigerian head of state General Olusegun Obasanjo, warned that Africa was falling into a state of "dereliction and decay."
Yet Africa remained low on the list of American foreign policy concerns. During the Reagan presidency Washington officials spoke of Africa as "a continent of great promise" with which the United States was effectively interacting on both economic and diplomatic fronts.1 The somber reality was that human conditions in Africa were continuing to deteriorate, despite a U.N.-sponsored recovery plan (1986-1990) under which many African states were undertaking unpopular structural reforms and austerity measures.
U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuéllar lamented the failure of industrialized donor states to respond to African reforms with increased assistance, saying that it was leading Africa "not to recovery and development but to drift and stagnation, if not a chronic state of crisis."2 Even in gold-rich South Africa, where the persistence of apartheid was a principal focus of the administration's Africa policy, economic conditions were worsening, exacerbated by the intensifying racial polarity.
On the other hand, Africa was approaching its fourth decade of independence with some plausible grounds for hope and avenues of opportunity. In southern Africa an agreement for the military disengagement of Cuban and South African forces from Angola and Namibia, respectively, held the possibility of converting this area of devastating conflict into an engine for development in the region. In West Africa, at an October 1988 Africa Leadership Forum convened by Nigeria's Obasanjo, he and other Africans presented tough, perceptive and prescriptive analyses aimed at deepening and expanding their commitment to disciplined recovery and development efforts...
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The end of the Cold War and of apartheid have "undermined the logic that once drove America's alliances of expediency on the continent, which were so inimical to expanding civil liberties in Africa". The West should develop a selective foreign policy, favouring states showing pro-market and pro-democracy traits, and showing "equal-opportunity hostility" to remaining despots.
For much of Africa this year, immediate threats to survival dominated national agendas. In the extreme north and south, Libya and South Africa attacked the territory of weaker neighbors. Less noticed but far more widely devastating, a harsh drought destroyed crops across the continent, confronting more than 20 million people with the prospect of starvation. Declining rates of per capita food production over the last decade, coupled with escalating debt and falling returns on exports, left many African states at the margins of existence--at least according to Western calculations. And at year's end, a military coup abruptly ended four years of American-style democratic government in Africa's largest nation, Nigeria, renewing fears about political upheaval throughout the continent.
President Reagan's sweep of 49 of the 50 states in the November 1984 elections set in motion mutations within both the Republican and Democratic Parties that have substantially affected U.S. relations with Africa. The mushrooming of groups and individuals in the coalition known as the Free South Africa Movement is ascribed by its founder, TransAfrica's Randall Robinson, to a post-election assessment that a very daring gamble was the only hope of keeping anti-apartheid activism alive in the face of another four years of "constructive engagement." On another front, the congressional leaders of the shattered Democratic Party seized upon apartheid as the most promising issue for drawing Jesse Jackson's constituency and other blacks sidelined during the campaign back into the party's mainstream. The 35 Republican congressmen who dispatched a sharply worded letter of protest against Pretoria's racial policies to South African Ambassador B. G. Fourie in December 1984 were at least partially motivated by a new belief that it was historically and practically shortsighted for the Republicans to concede the black vote and the civil rights constituency as a given to the Democratic Party.
