Beyond Globalism: Remaking American Foreign Economic Policy
The opening chapter of this interesting book is a masterful account of the changes in American foreign economic policy-and the world economy-since World War II. The following sections on trade, money, aid and multinationals are comprehensive but involve selectivity, which will draw a few dissents from those who stress different interpretations and facts. Professor Vernon and Ms. Spar are realistically gloomy about the prospects of international cooperation just when it is more needed than ever. They believe that what cannot be achieved by wide agreement must be sought by smaller combinations of countries-but we are not told who should try to do what. Since in the American system "it is pointless to attempt explaining any sequence of actions as if it resulted from the deliberations of a rational unitary actor," the book's recommendations stress methods of making policy rather than its content, which is disappointing. Among the most original of the many shrewd observations are those concerning "policy entrepreneurs" who appear from time to time in the executive branch and get things done in spite of the checks and balances that confuse the system-but they are not to be relied on as much in the future.
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The 1930s deserve their bad reputation. Unemployment, misery, for many people hunger and, for more, the lack of hope, went with all the other ills of the Great Depression. Then Hitler came to power and fascism around the world grew stronger. The invasions of China by Japan and Ethiopia by Italy, and the Franco rebellion in Spain that soon came to be seen as a kind of global civil war--all showed the way the world was going. Driven by economic pressures, the policies of democratic countries became more narrowly nationalistic; bilateral and preferential trade agreements increased and France, Britain and Holland did what they could to assert privileged positions in their colonies. Although the Soviet Union was hardly a worker's paradise, the very fact that it offered an alternative to collapsed capitalism stirred people's interest and the Kremlin had new cards to play with. The worried democracies, meanwhile, did little to check the rising strength of fascism and were led to make one concession after another. If the times had any redeeming feature, it was that they made people think.
The aftermath of the events of 1989 may have invalidated the simple division of the world, into democratic and totalitarian camps, which formed the basis of the Truman doctrine, "but another form of competition has been emerging that could be just as stark and just as pervasive... it is the contest between forces of integration and fragmentation". Forces for integration, or the breaking-down of barriers between nations which conduces to peace, include the communications revolution, growing economic inter-dependence and collective security. Forces of fragmentation, which conduce to war, include nationalism, certain types of religion, and socio-economic inequalities. Yet it is not clear that integrationist forces are generally benign, or fragmentationist forces generally malign, to US national interests, which has historically rested on the balancing of fragmented power. This should indeed remain the key principle of US and allied foreign policy, but henceforward the balance to be kept is not between entities, but between competing processes.
Although few U.S. politicians will admit it, antidumping policy has strayed far from its original purpose of guarding against predatory foreign firms. It is now little more than an excuse for a few powerful industries to shield themselves from competition -- at great cost to both American consumers and American business.

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