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Ending the Cold War

By Michael Mandelbaum
Spring 1989
Article Summary and Author Biography

The West should not under-estimate the USSR's capacity to reform, and to accommodate the West on the issues of (1) regional claims on Eastern Europe; although the WP is unlikely to dissolve, there are good chances that the Soviets will permit political pluralism (2) reduced military deployments (3) human rights.

Michael Mandelbaum is Director of the Project on East-West Relations and Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of The Fate of Nations: The Search for National Security in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries and the co-author, with Seweryn Bialer, of The Global Rivals. Copyright (c) 1989 by Michael Mandelbaum.

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