The threat of war between NATO and the WP still exists, though it is lessening. It could be further reduced by arms control and defence policies conducive "toward a structure of forces with a more defensive character, and with greater emphasis on new technologies that could reduce the role of heavy armored divisions". The basic goal is to reduce capability for sudden large-scale attack.
Henry Owen served as Chairman of the State Department Policy Planning Council (1966-69) and as Ambassador-at-Large for annual economic summits (1977-81). General Edward C. Meyer (retired) served as U.S. Army Chief of Staff from 1979 to 1983.
The threat of war in central Europe still exists. One does not have to credit Soviet leaders with an intent to attack Western Europe to believe this. The peoples of Eastern Europe are no more satisfied today with Soviet dominance than they were before 1914 with Austrian and Russian rule. Nor is it yet clear that the Soviet rulers are more ready to yield control of this region than were the Romanovs or the Hapsburgs.
Indeed, central Europe remains second only to the Middle East in its potential for conflicts that could embroil the great powers. To be sure, security arrangements in the region have helped to keep the peace for almost half a century. But these arrangements are changing, and new trends are taking shape:
-There are pressures for a reduction in U.S. and West German active forces on the central front; the emergence of a West European defense entity is being discussed more actively than in the past.
-Political and economic trends in Mikhail Gorbachev's Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe make an agreement on the reduction of conventional forces in central Europe more likely, with consequences that could lead to major changes in the defense posture on both sides.
-Military trends could move both NATO and the Warsaw Pact toward a structure of forces with a more defensive character, and with greater emphasis on new technologies that could reduce the role of heavy armored divisions.
If current security arrangements are in fact changing, what will take their place? To answer this question we turn first to an examination of political and economic trends in the West and in the East. This is followed by a review of changes in the military environment that will confront both alliances. In conclusion, we examine the courses of action that seem most likely to advance U.S. interests in regard to central European security.
II
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In the light of the anticipated INF agreement the question is whether confrontation is entering a genuine phase of de-escalation or merely a tactical one. Most NATO commanders agree that a surprise attack by conventional Soviet forces is improbable. NATO should develop a plan for exploiting the potential for reductions in conventional weapons and make a serious effort to achieve an agreement. There may be room for trade-offs in economic credits and managerial skills for large-scale Soviet force reductions.
Defends the traditional, pessimistic evaluation of NATO's conventional capabilities against revisionists, and argues that "NATO is highly unlikely to make the conventional force improvements seemingly dictated by the INF treaty". Predicts a Soviet arms control offensive upon "a vulnerable and divided NATO... the alliance has painted itself into a corner, and the paint will not dry". Despite all this, NATO will continue to prevent war in Europe.
Site of post-WW2 tensions, Berlin now finds itself relegated to the margin of political and economic change across Europe. Even the FRG is showing less and less interest in Berlin's future. Nevertheless, NATO should not ignore it, but include it in a new vision for FRG-GDR relations and the ending of the division of Europe.
