A Blind Eye to Nuclear Proliferation
The USA continues to under-estimate the danger to world security of continuing nuclear proliferation. As it normalizes relations with the USSR, the USA should "undertake a fresh assessment of the worldwide non-proliferation effort".
Gerard C. Smith served as Special Presidential Representative for nonproliferation negotiations from 1977 to 1980. Helena Cobban is a Guest Scholar at the Brookings Institution. When she worked on this article she was a Social Science Research Council/MacArthur Senior Fellow in International Peace and Security Studies.
President George Bush has taken office at a time of new challenges in world affairs. The thaw in relations with the Soviet Union provides a basis from which to pursue a further de-escalation of tensions between the world's two greatest military powers, and the opportunity to address some of the other urgent issues that confront the United States and the Soviet Union. One of the most important problems is that of nuclear proliferation-an issue that was both masked by the global tensions of the early 1980s and exacerbated by them.
As the United States and the Soviet Union put their relationship on a somewhat more even keel, the U.S. government should undertake a fresh assessment of the status of the worldwide nonproliferation effort. This assessment should include a sober reevaluation of America's contribution to that effort. To be sure, our country has much to be proud of. Most recently, in March 1988, U.S. pressure resulted in Taiwan's agreeing to dismantle a nuclear program of potential military significance. But the decisions successive presidents have made in other critical instances have undermined rather than strengthened the worldwide nonproliferation regime, which is based on the twin pillars of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Of all the nuclear weapons states, the United States has not been the only, or even probably the most egregious, offender against this regime. The United States, however, has adopted a frequently permissive attitude toward two nuclear "maverick" states in particular-Israel and Pakistan. This attitude has allowed both states to reach or cross the threshold of nuclear weapons possession. It has had a significant ripple effect in eroding the credibility of the NPT regime, since other potential proliferators can point to U.S. laxness, and it has eroded the credibility of publicly stated U.S. nonproliferation commitments. American permissiveness toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons by its friends acts against its own best interests and should be stopped.
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Discusses (1) the size of Soviet military forces (nuclear, naval, air and ground) (2) the ideological drive behind Soviet defence policy (3) possible future doctrinal developments. Since the late 1970s, changing technology has stimulated doctrinal change, giving rise to concepts of multi-front operations. But the doctrinal vision is at the moment unrealisable, and the Soviets may thus be seeking to reduce nuclear arsenals, so as to make defence of the rear easier in wartime. Concludes that, in the light of the continuing ideological basis of Soviet doctrine, the West must be careful not to underestimate the danger which lies behind the undermining of deterrence through badly-conceived arms control measures. Director, National Security Agency, 1985-88. Very useful analysis, recommended.
"Gorbachev's new thinking does not indicate that the Soviet Union wishes to abandon its role as a world power, but it provides a different picture of the world and redefines the Soviet role in it". Discusses (1) the failure of Brezhnev's foreign policy (2) Gorbachev's redefinition of Soviet thinking on international relations (3) new principles of defensive sufficiency (4) effects on arms control (5) domestic motivations. Professor of political science, Harvard University.
Freed from fixation on the struggle against the USSR, the USA "will need to think more broadly about the role of arms control in world politics", and will find itself sharing the same concerns as the USSR in respect of weapons and technology proliferation. Offers guidelines for US foreign policy (1) set realistic goals (2) co-operate with a reforming USSR while taking steps to reduce the risk of deteriorating relations should a counter-reformation occur.
