The New Phase in U.S.-Pakistani Relations
The two key issues are development aid levels and Pakistan's nuclear policy. On the first, argues that the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, plus US budget constraints, indicate that "extraordinarily high levels of aid cannot and should not be maintained". On the second, asserts that the USA should, if it proves unable to persuade Pakistan to renounce its nuclear programme, lower its sights and settle for Pakistani agreement not to test nuclear weapons.
Thomas P. Thornton is Adjunct Professor of Asian Studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of The Johns Hopkins University. From 1977 to 1981 he was a senior member of the staff of the National Security Council, concerned with South Asian affairs.
After a period of more than a decade during which Afghanistan dominated the political situation in South Asia, the withdrawal of Soviet forces has significantly altered the political situation within the region. India and Pakistan face new realities, and outside powers will also need to readjust their policies to take account of the changing issues in the region.
The political developments within Pakistan over the past year-the dismissal of civilian government in June 1988, the death of President Zia ul-Haq in August, national and provincial elections in November and the accession of Benazir Bhutto to the prime ministership-have altered not only the internal scene in Pakistan, but also the context in which Pakistan relates to its neighbors and to the rest of the world.
The Soviet involvement in Afghanistan drew the United States into a much more active role in South Asia than it had played for over a decade; a restored U.S. relationship with Pakistan was the principal channel. In Afghanistan the United States achieved a signal policy success; the determination of both the Carter and Reagan administrations to back the Afghan resistance forces has paid off beyond all expectations. The restoration of democratic rule in Pakistan is also something in which Americans can take satisfaction. Although the overwhelming credit belongs to the Pakistani people (just as the success in Afghanistan belongs largely to Afghans), the United States played a more than marginal role by making clear its preference for the restoration of democracy.
Like most foreign policy successes, these two developments have spawned new problems. The United States must consider how to react to the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan: Should we use this favorable situation to enhance our role in the region along the Soviets' southern flank? Or should the United States reduce its heavy commitment in such a distant region and postpone thinking about South Asia until more pressing problems elsewhere have been taken in hand?
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Reviews inter-state relations and foreign-policy initiatives in the Middle East in 1988, with special reference to US interests. Covers (1) Israel-PLO-US negotiations (2) the Iran-Iraq war and the UN peace plan (3) the US experience in Lebanon and the Gulf (4) arms purchases and the escalation of the regional arms race (5) future US interests and US-Soviet collaborative efforts in the region.
America's view of India as a nuclear revisionist state discounts India's many disarmament initiatives and its adherence to basic nonproliferation efforts.
India's and Pakistan's nuclear tests last May were a double setback: for security on the subcontinent and worldwide nonproliferation efforts. U.S. attempts to forge warmer relations with both countries were also casualties of the blasts. The tests could spark a chain of withdrawals from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, undermining the international consensus against the spread of nuclear arms. Cold War brinkmanship is no model for diplomacy. For their sake as well as the world's, India and Pakistan need to stabilize their nuclear rivalry at the lowest possible level, ban further tests, and embrace frequent, high-level bilateral talks to ease tensions.
