Korea-U.S. Relations: The Politics Of Trade And Security
This volume, another in the University of California's prolific series of conference volumes on contemporary East Asia, contains the reflections of 17 American and South Korean specialists on the bilateral relationship between the two countries. For the wealth of information and insights on the relationship it has few, if any, rivals. One of the most thoughtful contributions comes from Sang-Woo Rhee, a professor at Sogang University and a specialist on the R.O.K. military. Rhee contends that South Korea's deterrence capability against North Korea is weakened by the disproportionately small size of South Korea's air force and navy. This is because the United States deliberately programmed its military aid in such a way as to make South Korean armed forces "structurally dependent" on the United States-a strategy designed, according to Rhee, to achieve two goals: deter a North Korean invasion and prevent any possible attempt by South Korea to pose a military threat to the North. The South Korean desire to "reclaim autonomy" in deterrence capability would require a stronger intelligence-gathering network along with a stronger air and naval force, a self-reliant logistics program and a reassertion of full operational control of its military command. U.S. policymakers, he says, need to acknowledge the changed state of affairs between the two allies.
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Since the end of World War II, there have been three watersheds in Sino-Soviet relations. In February 1950, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China formed an alliance against the West. In the late 1950s, there was the beginning of the historic split between them that transformed international politics. Then, in the early 1970s, there began the Sino-American rapprochement that, by the end of the decade, completely altered the strategic landscape and led to an incipient Chinese-American alliance against the Soviet Union.
As a European, and particularly as a Briton, I had the unusual good fortune to come first to Asia by way of America. The African and Indian friendships formed during college days at Oxford whetted my appetite for an understanding of the non-white world, but only when I arrived at Berkeley for a postgraduate year did I enter the life of the Chinese, the Japanese, the Filipinos, the Indonesians-who were there by the score, sharing with me the experience of being a foreign student in the United States.
American optimism about East Asia, in precious short supply only a few years earlier, was abundantly available in 1980. "The arc from Korea through Taiwan and the Philippines, at the very center of great power rivalry for much of this century, is less subject to these strains today than at any time in well over forty years," Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke declared in June. Such pronouncements by U.S. policymakers were understandable: East Asia offered far more possibilities--for diplomatic overtures, for expanding trade--than anyone dared predict during the Vietnam era. But in 1980 enough warning signals were flashing throughout the region to suggest the need for a more balanced--and less buoyant--assessment.

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