Recognition of the GDR by the FRG would be a "political masterstroke", in which merely formal separation would be outweighed by substantive unity on various social and economic issues. See also Margarita Mathiopoulos 'Peace would settle the German question' IHT 1 Nov 1989 p6.
Anne-Marie Burley is Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School. She is currently finishing a book on the German question.
The inner-German border is the fault line of Europe. The current revival of speculation about "the German question" in any form, therefore, sends tremors throughout the postwar structure of East-West relations. Headlines ask "Could Germany Turn East?"1 The turmoil in East Germany threatens the existence of a separate East German state. President Bush disclaims any "fear" of German reunification.
In short, the future of Germany has reemerged as an issue for both East and West. The premise is that "fundamental" German desires for nationhood have been long buried, or at least camouflaged, in an unavoidable concession to reality. But as the postwar order begins to loosen or even crumble, German longings for unity seem to spring forth undiminished.
In fact, however, the German question is rooted as much in foreign myth as in German reality. In clinging to fixed ideas about the political division or reunification of Germany, Western analysts and commentators miss the emergence of many far more vital and interesting opportunities and issues facing German leaders. It is time to take a new look at the German question-but from the inside out.
II
The key distinction is between the German question and the German problem. For the majority of Germans in the postwar period the common denominator of various versions of the German question has been how to bring the Germans back together. For the majority of their neighbors, however, the German problem has been how to keep them apart. Yet even inside the Federal Republic of Germany (F.R.G.), a precise definition of die deutsche Frage is hard to come by. West German politicians tend to use the phrase as a launching pad for excursions into their own favorite political utopias. All agree on the vital importance of improving human rights and living conditions for citizens of the German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.), and most espouse the general principle of achieving some form of German unity within the framework of a European peace order. Yet these phrases and formulas mask three quite different conceptions of what the German question is really all about:
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