The moderates have a mandate in respect of economic policy, but are vulnerable to the hard-line anti-Western radicals in respect of foreign policy. The USA can do little but be cautious so as not to endanger the moderates' position.
Shireen T. Hunter is Deputy Director of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Her next book, Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade, will be published in 1990.
The death of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini on June 3, 1989, closed a turbulent chapter in Iran's long history and opened a new and still uncertain phase in its evolution as a nation. The passing of the man who branded America as the "Great Satan" also created expectations that a decade of U.S.-Iranian animosity will, in time, come to an end.
In the last few months an indirect and unacknowledged dialogue has begun between Iran and the United States-prompted, unfortuitously, by Israel's abduction of a radical Lebanese Shi'ite leader, Sheikh Abdul Karim Obeid, on July 28, and the subsequent execution of an American hostage in Lebanon, Colonel William Higgins. Despite its tragic auspices, this indirect dialogue has been noteworthy for its largely moderate and unprovocative tone and the efforts of both sides to avoid confrontation and crisis.
These developments bode well for the future of U.S.-Iranian relations. Before any breakthrough can be expected, however, certain trends in Iran must continue and deepen. Similarly, U.S. attitudes will need to develop in new directions and some of the old premises of U.S. policy toward Iran will need to be reassessed in response to the changing scene there.
II
Most observers of Iranian affairs had long expected that Khomeini's death would create a power vacuum in Iran, with intense infighting among its Islamic leaderships. Developments during the months immediately preceding the Ayatollah's death only fueled these expectations. Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, the designated successor as Iran's spiritual leader, was abruptly and unceremoniously dismissed on March 28, 1989; moderating trends in Iranian politics were reversed amid the outcry against the controversial author Salman Rushdie; radical figures appeared to have regained Khomeini's ear and favor.
During this period Iran's leadership was engaged in a heated debate over the reform of its Islamic constitution, focusing especially on the respective roles of the president, the parliament and the prime minister. As it stood, the constitution, especially the division of executive power between the president and the prime minister, had made governing almost impossible.
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Every president since Richard Nixon has recognized that ensuring stability in the Persian Gulf is a vital U.S. interest. In its first term, the Clinton administration attempted to deal with the twin dangers of Iran and Iraq through a strategy of "dual containment" that kept both countries boxed in with economic sanctions and military monitoring. Dual containment, however, is more a slogan than a strategy, and far too blunt an instrument to serve American interests in the Middle East. The United States must employ a more nuanced approach, keeping the straitjacket on Saddam while seeking improved relations with Iran.
Economic bans and political invective against Iran have not worked. America, not the Islamic Republic, has become isolated. Meanwhile, both because sanctions are leaky and because they have pushed it to become more self-sufficient, Iran is actually doing better than many countries the United States has assisted. The sanctions also give the Islamic regime a scapegoat for its serious problems at home, merely prolonging its hold on power. The United States should abandon containment for a strategy of critical dialogue.
Both in public and underground, Iranians are debating the legitimacy of the Islamic state that Khomeini built. Students challenge the notion that Islam has all the answers but evince pride in an Iran free of the shah and under no foreign master. The religious and secular elites are increasingly willing to contemplate pluralism and openness to the world, though most makers of the revolution remain obdurate and appeal to anti-Americanism to stir up the masses. Washington needs to listen to the new voices of Iran.

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