Describes how Gen Noriega, a former chief of intelligence, has subverted Panamanian democracy, and continues to cling to power despite strenuous US efforts to dislodge him. US options are now reduced to two -- drastic military action, or acquiescence.
Linda S. Robinson, Senior Editor of Foreign Affairs, is writing a book on Central America and Panama to be published by the Council on Foreign Relations in 1990.
Panama has bedeviled every American president since Lyndon Johnson, who was forced to open negotiations over the Panama Canal after anti-American riots broke out there in 1964. It is not too surprising that Panama became President Bush's first foreign policy crisis.
In its last year in office the Reagan Administration decided to force the removal of longtime U.S. ally General Manuel Antonio Noriega, the de facto leader of Panama. It left office without accomplishing that goal, suffering embarrassment and criticism. The Bush Administration has pursued the same objective but no more successfully. General Noriega has continued to resist American pressures and escaped a coup in early October, when the United States chose to stand by as the rebellion collapsed.
The Bush Administration was deluged with criticism for being unwilling to back its rhetorical opposition to Noriega with more concrete action. Believing that an ideal opportunity to unseat Noriega had been lost, critics charged that the Bush Administration was indecisive. At a minimum, the episode suggested that the United States was unprepared to aid the very event that it had been encouraging. The Panama problem now seems likely to continue to fester, with no clear U.S. strategy in place to deal with it.
Panama is an unusual case. It is one of the few Third World countries whose problems arouse domestic opinion, mainly because Americans still care about the canal, the basic reason for the long and intimate relationship between the United States and Panama. Furthermore, the United States has identified Noriega as a major actor in the drug trade, thus making him a public enemy in an area that some polls identify as Americans' most pressing concern. Finally, the close U.S. relationship with the Panamanian military since its creation confers a responsibility that makes the Panama issue difficult for the United States to walk away from. Yet, even though the United States has escalated Noriega's rule to a major foreign policy issue, the range of measures employed to deal with it has been limited.
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Recent and forthcoming elections in key Latin American countries come at a time when US relations with many states in the region are particularly uncertain. Discusses six areas which should be addressed by policy-makers (1) the debt crisis (2) the need for co-operation between the USA, Europe, Canada and Latin American countries in ending Central America's wars (3) support of democratic institutions (4) the drug problem (5) the need to rebuild inter-American institutions (6) relations with Mexico and Panama. Concludes that too much attention has been devoted to Nicaragua at the expense of greater concerns, although straightforward solutions are unlikely. Former US ambassador to the Organization of American States, and co-negotiator of the Panama Canal treaties. A substantial criticism of Reagan's policy in Central and South America, and interesting for its view of both regions as one.
Covers US foreign policy in Latin America during 1988, discussing (1) Nicaragua (2) Panama and the Noriega problem (3) drug trafficking (4) the progress towards democracy (5) the debt crisis. Concludes that future US policy will have to centre around Mexico and the Caribbean basin, but that this should not obscure America's long-term interest in a steadily-improving economic situation throughout Latin America.
The Feb 1990 election defeat of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, although a most welcome development for US foreign policy, has (like Noriega's removal in Panama) left a less-than-successful aftertaste. "Having lost its principal foes, both locally and in the once-grand struggle of ideologies, the United States found that it had also lost its principal anchor and guide in dealing with Latin America".
