Throughout 1989, "both superpowers centered their most important diplomatic and political strategies on West Germany, at times in competition, at times in tacit consent to Bonn's new position of strength". Summarizes the year's events in terms of (1) Gorbachev's policies, which "demonstrated a deep understanding of the consequences of the decay of the East European bloc and the acceleration of the economic integration of the West" (2) Bush's detailed grasp of issues, and "evident caution and reflectiveness" (3) the challenges now facing Western and Eastern Europe -- German re-unification, EC assistance in rebuilding the Eastern democracies and their economies, redefining EC relationships with the superpowers, forging a European security structure.
Jim Hoagland is Associate Editor and Chief Foreign Correspondent of The Washington Post. His column on foreign affairs is syndicated by The Washington Post Writers Group.
A year of revolutionary change has given Europeans, East and West, a new vision of a common destiny distinct from the ambitions and needs of the Soviet Union and the United States. In impoverished Eastern Europe, 1989 brought a glorious upheaval against a dying order; in the prosperous West it brought an adjustment both hopeful and apprehensive. The rush of change and the echoes it produced across the continent affirmed that Europe still exists as a political and strategic entity, even after four decades of cold war division and, in the East, subjugation and tyranny. Finally and unabashedly, it was the Year of Europe, beyond any policy planner's dream. The long winter of world conflict based on the division of Europe seemed to be approaching an end.
While visible and radical changes were occurring behind a collapsing Iron Curtain, more subtle but nonetheless fundamental shifts in power balances were under way in the western part of the continent. West German influence on European events became dominant, filling much of the vacuum created by the Soviet political retreat and a small but perceptible American retrenchment.
Throughout the year both superpowers centered their most important diplomatic and political strategies on West Germany, at times in competition, at times in tacit consent to Bonn's new position of strength. The same was true of Bonn's partners in the European Community (EC). French diplomacy was occupied with trying to guide and control West Germany's power, especially after Bonn made clear its intent to pursue German reunification actively. Britain's Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher sought, more simplistically, to deny and then to obstruct German power in NATO and in economic affairs. She failed on both scores, and her prestige suffered at home and in Europe as a result.
The whirlwind of change that swept over Eastern Europe was created in a nexus of Soviet weakness and West German strength. The results, which promised to fulfill Roosevelt's vision of Yalta and overcome Stalin's corruption of the outcome of that conference, came without significant U.S. involvement. The opportunity to play a reactive role while events moved favorably for U.S. interests fit President Bush's desire not to commit American prestige and resources too deeply to a suddenly unpredictable Eastern Europe...
This is a premium article
You must be a logged in Foreign Affairs subscriber to continue reading. If you wish to continue reading this article please subscribe , or activate your online account to get full online access.
Log In
Related
European elites lambaste the United States for bad behavior at home and hegemonic hubris abroad. These Europeans see an ominous transatlantic "values gap" emerging over the death penalty, guns, "Frankenfoods," and unchecked capitalism. And Washington's unilateralist obstinance on issues such as missile defense, land mines, and global warming only makes matters worse. But a closer look shows that Europe and the United States are in fact converging culturally, economically, and even strategically. This phony crisis in relations only makes it more difficult to tap the full potential of the transatlantic partnership.
Over the full range of contemporary foreign affairs, American policy toward Western Europe has been marked by durability and rare continuity. The change of neither Presidents, Secretaries of State nor political parties has altered the lines of basic policy. The Government marches with American public opinion, for that ubiquitous man in the street still feels deeply that Western Europe is vital to the United States.
In many areas, transatlantic cooperation is stronger than ever before. Yet the common perception is of an increasingly fraught relationship, as evidenced by the well-known disputes over beef, bananas, and burden sharing. Assumptions are diverging over security risks and cultural values. Each side criticizes the other's unwieldy policymaking process without admitting its own shortcomings, while leaders pander to domestic interests and prejudices without educating voters on international issues. Europe nonetheless remains indispensable to a multilateral U.S. foreign policy. The Bush administration must acknowledge the European Union as a true partner, in political and military matters as well as in economics. America cannot expect its allies to share the burdens of global leadership without allowing them their say in the issues at stake.

Sign-up for free weekly updates from ForeignAffairs.com.