America's New Course

For the past fifty years American foreign policy has been formed in response to the threat posed by this country's opponents and enemies. In virtually every year since Pearl Harbor, the United States has been engaged either in war or in confrontation. Now, for the first time in half a century, the United States has the opportunity to reconstruct its foreign policy free of most of the constraints and pressures of the Cold War.

Upon reaching such a turning point, it is natural to fall back on certain basic principles as a guide to charting a new course. This is a difficult undertaking for the United States. The basic foreign policy principle of the Founding Fathers-nonentanglement-was prescribed for a weak republic surrounded by the territories of stronger European powers, who were determined to carry their ancient struggles to the New World. Nonentanglement in these endless conflicts was clearly in the national interest of the fledgling United States, and for well over 150 years the United States was secure behind the protection of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans (and the British fleet). But Pearl Harbor destroyed the illusion that America could somehow remain safe while ignoring distant threats to the peace in Europe and Asia.

Since 1941 the United States has been fully entangled. Now as we move into a new era, a yearning for American nonentanglement may be returning in various guises. If the Cold War is over-and there seems to be a growing consensus that it is-how far should the United States go in disengaging from the positions it created during the past fifty years? Can America at long last come home?

The answer is not at all clear. The United States does in fact enjoy the luxury of some genuine choices for the first time since 1945. America and its allies have won the Cold War, and some disengagement is quite possible. No demands are heard from responsible quarters for a return to isolation, but there are proposals from both right and left for a substantial reduction in the American presence abroad. Even the centrists who advise maintaining a significant American involvement allow for some retrenchment.

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