Gorbachev's political liberalization has not produced economic revitalization, but rather economic crisis which threatens his political survival.
Marshall I. Goldman is the Kathryn W. Davis Professor of Soviet Economics at Wellesley College and Associate Director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University. This article is adapted from a paper prepared for the John M. Olin Critical Issues Seminar.
The Soviet Union today is a radically different place from what it was five years ago when Mikhail Gorbachev became general secretary of the Communist Party. Admittedly, Gorbachev promised then that his goal would be to reform Soviet economic and political life. But the Soviet people had heard similar promises before, almost all of which had ended up unfulfilled. No wonder few anticipated that in a few years the Soviet Union would in fact legalize the formation of such un-Soviet institutions as cooperative and private businesses, joint ventures with foreigners, and economic autonomy for several of the Soviet republics. It would have been even more farfetched to predict that there would also be glasnost, secret ballots, the disappearance of the secretariat of the Communist Party, the creation of a Supreme Soviet and a presidency that would usurp much power from the Central Committee and the Politburo, calls for regional secession and, finally, an end to the Communist Party's monopoly in political life.
Gorbachev deserves enormous credit, not only for what he has accomplished but also for the fact that he has managed to ride out these transformations-many of which have been rather tumultuous. But while his efforts at political liberalization have been extraordinarily fruitful, his attempts to revitalize the Soviet economy so far have failed. Economic reform was Gorbachev's number-one priority. He promised a radical transformation of the economy, which he eventually came to call perestroika. If it succeeded, the Soviet Union would be competitive not only in terms of conventional products such as machine tools, but also in the field of high technology. Equally important, soon after assuming power he promised to raise "the economic well-being of the Soviet peoples to a qualitatively new level."1
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Analysis of the 'Shatalin plan' to introduce a market economy within 500 days.
US policy to isolate the USSR from the world economy (such as the 1974 Jackson-Vanik amendment, the grain embargo, and the attempt to impede the Soviet-European gas pipeline) ought now to be discontinued, so that (1) Western businesses can discover the new Soviet market (2) an economic wedge can be inserted to prevent backsliding in Soviet political and economic reform.
Most people think that Russia's economic problems are due to the shock of fast and radical reforms. Actually, the Russian economy is not very liberalized at all, and its problems have been caused by reforms that were too slow and partial, not too sweeping. Russia suffers not from too free a market but from corruption, which thrives by preying on an unwieldy bureaucracy. Still, the outlook for the months ahead is promising. If Poland could do it, why can't Russia? The private sector got a salutary wake-up call from the 1998 collapse of the ruble, and the strength of the political center bodes well for economic recovery and social change.

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