War, Peace, And Victory: Strategy And Statecraft
Gray is always thought-provoking, and this book is no exception. It is a disquisition on the strategist's profession, not a recommended strategy for the United States. Its charge to strategists is complicated and demanding: for instance, to see a mosaic without making the mistake of "essentialism" or "reductionism" (i.e., strategy is essentially paradoxical; U.S. and Soviet theater forces are essentially akin) and to draw on history without reducing it to misleading analogies, such as Paul Kennedy's suggestion that America's overstretch resembles imperial Spain's.
Related
US public expectations of a 'peace dividend' from the collapse of the socialist bloc are unrealistic. Structural properties of US defence policy-making, and the non-existence of any strategic vision not predicated on the monolithic Soviet threat, mean that "for the next several years the 'peace dividend' will be much smaller than enthusiasts hope, and earning it will require departures from customary congressional habits". Offers advice on a strategy for reducing US defence expenditure (1) avoid a return to the 'hollow army' by shifting towards reserve or 'round-out' units (2) cut US forces in Europe in the light of CFE results, not in advance of them (3) defer various high-price equipment programmes, while preserving R&D budgets (4) using arms control to cut what the USA "can safely do without".
U.S. spending on foreign policy--defense, aid, and diplomacy--has been halved since 1962, while entitlements grab evermore tax dollars. Congress should now be investing more in national security, not beggaring it for a peace dividend.
The recent troubles of the CIA date back to its early years, when dashing young men toyed with foreign governments. Evan Thomas evokes the time. Jeffrey T. Richelson catalogs the consequences.

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