Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising
Peretz, who for more than four decades has been immersed in the Israeli-Palestinian problem with a devotion to objectivity and to the idea of reconciliation, gives the background and describes the course of the uprising and its effects on the two societies. Less colorful than Intifada by Schiff and Ya'ari (noted in Foreign Affairs, Spring 1990), Peretz's book is more organized and comprehensive in providing information, especially on the international dimensions of the conflict. It brings the reader to similar conclusions: the revolt will go on; no solution, by force or negotiation, is in sight; the effect is to polarize both societies and to threaten greater tension and violence in the future.
Related
The purpose of recent American diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East is simply stated. It is to stop the fighting and bring the peace effort back to the point, now nearly three years ago, when Ambassador Gunnar Jarring was setting out on his mission to help bring about an agreed Arab-Israeli settlement on the basis of a unanimous U.N. resolution. It is a measure of the deterioration since that time that these modest proposals, the results of which are uncertain as these lines are written, have generated optimism by their initial success in breaking the fixed pattern of reliance on force alone. For they came at a time of gloom over the prospects for settlement and of alarm over military events which could bring major Soviet gains or grave risk of war. Participation of Soviet pilots and missile crews in military operations had already limited Israel's mastery of the skies over Egypt and might in time shift the balance of power which now favors Israel. Once that balance is upset, President Nixon has said, the United States "will do what is necessary" to restore it.
Throughout 1978 the Middle East was at or near the top of the Carter Administration's foreign policy agenda. For the first time in 30 years an Arab-Israeli peace settlement - at least a partial one - was a practical possibility once President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977 had opened the door. As the year began, it was clear that the parties would need mediation and help to reach the promised land of peace and that the United States, the old friend of Israel and new friend of Egypt, was admirably placed to escort them there. The Soviet Union, on bad terms with both Israel and Egypt, was out of the picture. The signs for productive American diplomacy were favorable.
