In the post-Cold War world of uncertainty, intelligence is more important than ever, and Congress must not succumb to pressures to reduce the US intelligence budget.
George A. Carver, Jr., a former intelligence officer, is John M. Olin Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., and President of C and S Associates, Inc., a consulting firm. He is also a member of the Defense Department's Special Operations Policy Advisory Group.
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The shock of September 11 focused long-overdue attention on the failings of the U.S. intelligence system. But less than a year after the passage of a landmark intelligence reform bill, the prospects for real change are increasingly remote. Bureaucratic self-protection and insider squabbling have thwarted sound policy yet again, and the consequences for national security could be dire.
The main premises and objectives of the Boren and McCurdy bills on reorganization of the US intelligence community are clearly right, but they have certain features inconsistent with those promises (1) the assumption that the NSC "will remain the paramount policy forum for the President", when it is "in some respects an anachronism" (2) the proposed centralization of budget control under the DNI (3) the proposal to remove certain analysis functions from the CIA would result in its becoming more like the 'dirty tricks' organization that its "dubious image" already presents it as being (4) the proposed new Directorate for Estimates and Analysis ignores the historically-proven need for competition, rather than centralization, in this area.
Most Americans have made no sacrifices at all for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The burden should be shared. It’s long past time for Congress to enact a wartime tax, something it's done in almost every war in the past.
