Command, Control And Common Defense
If America's military services are all supposed to be on the same side, why are they so different? This soldier/scholar's answer, nicely done, is their institutional histories and personalities. The young American republic determined that its commerce required a permanent navy, but would raise an army only if and as circumstances required. The doctrines of the two services were sharply different: combined arms for the army meant discretion at low levels but centralization at the top; the navy by contrast centered authority in ship captains, with more decentralization at the top. What is needed is a "strategic paradigm" that would unify these separate perspectives born of distinct operational requirements.
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US public expectations of a 'peace dividend' from the collapse of the socialist bloc are unrealistic. Structural properties of US defence policy-making, and the non-existence of any strategic vision not predicated on the monolithic Soviet threat, mean that "for the next several years the 'peace dividend' will be much smaller than enthusiasts hope, and earning it will require departures from customary congressional habits". Offers advice on a strategy for reducing US defence expenditure (1) avoid a return to the 'hollow army' by shifting towards reserve or 'round-out' units (2) cut US forces in Europe in the light of CFE results, not in advance of them (3) defer various high-price equipment programmes, while preserving R&D budgets (4) using arms control to cut what the USA "can safely do without".
Noel Malcolm's history of Serbia's flashpoint province is marred by his sympathies for its ethnic Albanian separatists, anti-Serbian bias, and illusions about the Balkans.
Japan faces its biggest foreign policy challenges since World War II. Its leaders must snap out of their deep funk to confront a rising China, a nuclear South Asia, a United States increasingly prone to Japan-bashing, and a world in economic free fall. Instead of sulking over the growing closeness of U.S.-China ties, Tokyo should take the initiative and propose trilateral dialogues with Beijing and Washington on a range of issues, especially Asian security, nuclear disarmament, and macroeconomic policy. Japan's pessimism threatens the world's prosperity. If Tokyo stays on the sidelines, the world will pass it by.

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