Assessing Peace In A Changing World: Critical Choices For The West's Strategic And Arms Control Policies; Regaining The High Ground: NATO's Stake In The New Talks On Conventional Armed Forces In Europe; Conventional Force Reductions: A Dynamic Assessment
The rapid changes in Europe have not left these books unscathed, but all are written by distinguished analysts and all remain useful. The book by Davis is a brief, readable primer to the arms control issues, nuclear and strategic, confronting the United States and its European allies. Epstein, half of whose book is tables, meticulously assesses how the balance of conventional forces in Europe would be affected by various arms control agreements. The purposes of Blechman and his colleagues are broader, looking at political as well as military stakes in arms negotiations.
Related
As the United States and Europe dither, an often-ignored factor is increasingly imperiling NATO's future: the sorry state of transatlantic cooperation in the defense industry. The U.S. and European defense industries are growing increasingly separate, undermining NATO's political base and strengthening America's isolationists. The leading defense companies on both sides of the Atlantic should start working together -- for their mutual benefit, and for NATO's.
In many areas, transatlantic cooperation is stronger than ever before. Yet the common perception is of an increasingly fraught relationship, as evidenced by the well-known disputes over beef, bananas, and burden sharing. Assumptions are diverging over security risks and cultural values. Each side criticizes the other's unwieldy policymaking process without admitting its own shortcomings, while leaders pander to domestic interests and prejudices without educating voters on international issues. Europe nonetheless remains indispensable to a multilateral U.S. foreign policy. The Bush administration must acknowledge the European Union as a true partner, in political and military matters as well as in economics. America cannot expect its allies to share the burdens of global leadership without allowing them their say in the issues at stake.
The NATO war in Kosovo did not come out of the blue. The alliance fought only after Belgrade turned a deaf ear to diplomacy, and NATO knew the risks it was running. But doing nothing would have been worse; assenting to Slobodan Milosevic's mass killings would have dangerously undermined the credibility of Western institutions.
