Every Spy A Prince: The Complete History Of Israel's Intelligence Community
Written by two Israeli journalists, this history is neither complete nor based on primary sources (which necessarily remain secret), but it is investigative journalism of the first rank. It gives the most expansive account yet of the Mossad, its leading personalities (both spymasters and spies), striking exploits and bumbling failures since independence. If the narrative has gaps, it also has revelations as it runs through cases such as the Lavon affair, the nuclear program, the assassinations of Arab enemies, the rescue of Ethiopian Jews, the Pollard embarrassment and Irangate. Neither a whitewashing nor an indictment, the book shows how well, on most but not all occasions, the intelligence agencies have served Israeli interests.
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In Yitzhak Shamir's new autobiography, the last surviving founding father of the Israeli right watches uncomprehendingly as history leaves him behind.
Throughout 1978 the Middle East was at or near the top of the Carter Administration's foreign policy agenda. For the first time in 30 years an Arab-Israeli peace settlement - at least a partial one - was a practical possibility once President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977 had opened the door. As the year began, it was clear that the parties would need mediation and help to reach the promised land of peace and that the United States, the old friend of Israel and new friend of Egypt, was admirably placed to escort them there. The Soviet Union, on bad terms with both Israel and Egypt, was out of the picture. The signs for productive American diplomacy were favorable.
The purpose of recent American diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East is simply stated. It is to stop the fighting and bring the peace effort back to the point, now nearly three years ago, when Ambassador Gunnar Jarring was setting out on his mission to help bring about an agreed Arab-Israeli settlement on the basis of a unanimous U.N. resolution. It is a measure of the deterioration since that time that these modest proposals, the results of which are uncertain as these lines are written, have generated optimism by their initial success in breaking the fixed pattern of reliance on force alone. For they came at a time of gloom over the prospects for settlement and of alarm over military events which could bring major Soviet gains or grave risk of war. Participation of Soviet pilots and missile crews in military operations had already limited Israel's mastery of the skies over Egypt and might in time shift the balance of power which now favors Israel. Once that balance is upset, President Nixon has said, the United States "will do what is necessary" to restore it.

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