Making Defense Reform Work; American Defense Annual, 1990-1991
In 1986 Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols bill, aiming to strengthen "joint" military voices over those of individual services in defense policymaking, and the president established the Packard Commission to overhaul defense management. How have results been so far? "Mixed" is the answer of the distinguished authors of the Blackwell-Blechman volume, an answer less heartening still, since it was mostly written before the revolutions of 1989. Defense reform is one of a number of topics covered in the Kruzel volume, the sixth in a series of valuable yearly, nonpartisan reviews of American security policy, which also contains useful source material.
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US public expectations of a 'peace dividend' from the collapse of the socialist bloc are unrealistic. Structural properties of US defence policy-making, and the non-existence of any strategic vision not predicated on the monolithic Soviet threat, mean that "for the next several years the 'peace dividend' will be much smaller than enthusiasts hope, and earning it will require departures from customary congressional habits". Offers advice on a strategy for reducing US defence expenditure (1) avoid a return to the 'hollow army' by shifting towards reserve or 'round-out' units (2) cut US forces in Europe in the light of CFE results, not in advance of them (3) defer various high-price equipment programmes, while preserving R&D budgets (4) using arms control to cut what the USA "can safely do without".
U.S. spending on foreign policy--defense, aid, and diplomacy--has been halved since 1962, while entitlements grab evermore tax dollars. Congress should now be investing more in national security, not beggaring it for a peace dividend.
The recent troubles of the CIA date back to its early years, when dashing young men toyed with foreign governments. Evan Thomas evokes the time. Jeffrey T. Richelson catalogs the consequences.

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